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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  Background and Motivation 
The past two decades have witnessed a gradual increase in women joining the upper 
echelons of public corporations which have been conventionally dominated by men (Fortune 
2004). This phenomenon has led to greater attention from researchers regarding the impact of 
female executives on firm outcomes. Considering the systematic behavioral differences in gender 
and the crucial role of top management, the increased female participation in the upper echelons 
may reflect not only a trend towards gender equality but also a growing recognition of specific 
benefits uniquely associated with female executives (e.g., Huang & Kisgen, 2013; Khan & 
Vieito, 2013; Liu, Wei, & Xie, 2016). Given the important financial and strategic decisions made 
by top management (Chava & Purnanandam, 2010), the gender structure in the upper echelons 
could influence firm outcomes. 
However, much of prior research in the business literature has focused predominantly on 
the effect of gender diversity in the board of directors (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Gul, 
Hutchinson, & Lai, 2013; Strobl, Rama, & Mishra, 2016) and in the top management team 
(TMT) (Francoeur, Labelle, & Sinclair-Desgagné, 2008) rather than the gender of a single top 
executive. A smaller number of researchers have examined the influence of female Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) on the firm (Faccio, Marchica, & Mura, 2016; Khan & Vieito, 2013; 
Wolfers, 2006). To the extent that gender-based differences in behavior have been studied 
comprehensively in the psychology and gender literatures but less so in accounting and finance 
literatures, there is a gap in our understanding of the gender impact on decision-making made by 





gender effect of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) position, which has gained in prominence in 
recent years and whose importance is next only to the CEO.  
Recently, researchers have begun to recognize the importance of the CFO to firm 
outcomes. Current empirical research comparing male and female CFOs in terms of accounting 
and financial decision-making has found a number of differences. Specifically, female CFOs are 
believed to display less tax aggressiveness (Francis, Hasan, Wu, & Yan, 2014), pursue more 
conservative accounting policies (Francis, Hasan, Park, & Wu, 2015), are less likely to 
manipulate earnings (Liu et al., 2016), provide higher quality of earnings (Peni & Vähämaa, 
2010), report higher quality of accruals (Barua, Davidson, Rama, & Thiruvadi, 2010), and tend 
to undertake fewer and less risky acquisitions (Huang & Kisgen, 2013) than their male 
counterparts.  
In this study, I take a three-pronged approach to empirically explicate a number of 
theories of gender-based differences in business. First, I investigate whether participants in 
financial markets respond differently to the appointment of a female CFO than to that of a male 
CFO and what the response implies regarding their views on the efficacy of female executives 
relative to male executives. To the extent that investors are either more skeptical about female 
executives’ abilities due to perceived gender stereotypes (Powell & Ansic, 1997), confident 
about their flexible style of leadership (Eagly & Carli, 2003), or convinced that their skills are 
more valuable to certain business environments, the impact of female CFO hiring 
announcements on the stock market reaction can give us clues as to how investors consider 
female executives’ effectiveness compared to that of their male counterparts.  
Second, I investigate whether the gender of an executive affects post-hiring firm 





influence of CFO gender on firm performance remains unexplored in the literature. Since a 
CFO’s influence on the firm’s accounting reporting and financial decisions is distinct from that 
of a CEO (Chava & Purnanandam, 2010; Francis, Hasan, & Wu, 2013; Jiang, Petroni, & Wang, 
2010), the extent to which CFO gender has economic impact on firm performance is of interest 
to corporate boards, financial analysts, and investors. Because the effect of CFOs’ behavioral 
tendencies may vary with the uncertainty firms face, I also consider the relevance of gender to 
firms with varied growth opportunities. For example, prior literature shows that women are less 
overconfident and/or more risk-averse than men, their behavioral tendencies may make them 
more appropriate for firms operating in less volatile environments, i.e., low growth firms. 
Finally, I examine the impact of CFO gender on the firm’s cash holdings. On the one 
hand, determining the level of cash holdings is one of the most important decisions made by the 
management, and the rise of corporate cash holdings in U.S. corporations is a major concern for 
investors and researchers (Bates, Kahle, & Stulz, 2009). On the other hand, recent studies 
document a strong relation between the cash reserves and managers’ attributes such as age, 
experience, managerial ownership, and founder status, among small and medium-sized 
enterprises (e.g., Orens & Reheul, 2013; Steijvers & Niskanen, 2012). Due to the significant 
behavioral differences between men and women, I expect that the gender of the CFO may also 
influence the firm’s cash holdings. 
Two of the five theories that I investigate, overconfidence and risk-aversion, have similar 
predictions in certain situations (Barber & Odean, 2001; Huang & Kisgen, 2013). Particularly, 
both less risk-averse and highly overconfident managers are expected to take on more risk and to 
be less conservative in their policies (e.g. leverage, dividends, acquisitions, etc.). My research 





Among all C-Suite members, I choose to study the CFO for several reasons. First, the 
CFO has become the second most important member of the TMT after the CEO with most firms 
having a CFO (Nath & Mahajan, 2008). In addition, the number of female CFOs in S&P 1500 
companies has been on an upward trend over the last three decades (Francis et al., 2013), 
allowing for strong statistical tests. Third, of all the upper echelon members, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) requests only the CEO and CFO to certify the firm’s financial 
statements. Fourth, as the one who is mainly responsible for the financial reporting process and 
financial strategies (Aier, Comprix, Gunlock, & Lee, 2005), the CFO possesses superior insights 
into the firm’s financial health and performance, perhaps even more than the CEO (Wang, Shin, 
& Francis, 2012).  
Further, since CFOs are believed to assume full responsibility for the financial and 
treasury functions of the organization, as well as for preparing internal and external reports, they 
are in a good position to exert influence on cash holdings (Campello, Graham, & Harvey, 2010). 
Also, CFOs are expected to contribute to value creation through involvement in financial and 
investment decisions (Graham & Harvey, 2002) as well as play a decisive role in the firm’s 
success or failure (Mian, 2001). Finally, unlike other members of the TMT, the responsibilities 
of CFOs are relatively more consistent and homogenous across firms, making results more 
generalizable.  
The total sample (including performance period) spans the period 1994–2016 and is 
composed of 1,349 CFO appointments. To separate the impact of gender on decision-making 
quality from other determining factors such as education (Becker, 1964; Palia, 2001) and work 
experience (Cline & Yore, 2016), I control for these CFO credentials in my analysis by hand 





First, I document that investors respond relatively more negatively (positively) to the 
appointments of female CFOs at firms with high (low) growth opportunities. Second, the 
evidence suggests an improvement in operating performance of firms hiring female CFOs, 
especially among those characterized by low uncertainty. In addition to firm characteristics, the 
analysis also controls for a host of variables such as CFO’s characteristics, CEO’s 
characteristics, board size, and gender diversity in the TMT and in the board. The enhanced firm 
performance can be attributed to reduction in costs and improved working capital management. 
Finally, I find that female CFOs are more likely to reduce the excess cash holdings than 
their male counterparts, leading to a reduction in the agency costs of free cash flow. The 
combination of the findings on stock price response, firm performance, and cash holdings is 
consistent with the overconfidence hypothesis, suggesting that women are less overconfident 
than men and that lower overconfidence confers benefits only in cash-rich firms and those with 
lower uncertainty. The results do not support the risk-aversion, androgyny, self-selection, or the 
gender bias hypotheses.  
My results are corroborated when using an alternative measure of performance, namely, 
the change in buy-and-hold returns. Additionally, the findings are robust to various methods that 
address potential endogeneity concerns such as the propensity score technique, Heckman’s 
(1979) two-stage model, the mover dummy variable method (MDV) (which extracts the 
relevance of gender from executive fixed-effect), and the difference-in-differences method.  
The insights from this study make important empirical contributions to the literature on 
upper echelons by providing evidence on the impact of a top executive’s gender on firm 
outcomes (e.g. Faccio et al., 2016; Khan & Vieito, 2013; Wolfers, 2006). I also complement and 





2015; Liu et al., 2016; Peni & Vähämaa, 2010; Huang & Kisgen, 2013) by exploring the overall 
influence of female CFOs on firm performance while controlling for other important factors such 
as CFOs’ educational credentials and experience. I also contribute to the literature on investors’ 
viewpoints of a top executive’s gender. Further, I contribute to the cash holdings and agency cost 
literatures by showing that female CFOs tend to relatively reduce excess cash reserves and thus 
mitigate the agency costs of free cash flow compared to their male counterparts. Finally, I 
contribute to the growing literature on overconfidence by demonstrating the effect of gender-
based overconfidence on firm performance. 
1.2 Organization of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I review the current 
literature and develop hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes my data and sample selection process. 
Empirical findings are presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes. Appendices and tables are 















CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1.  Literature Review 
  The psychology, gender, and the medical literatures report several gender-based 
differences in behavior between men and women, which can be attributed to a number of factors, 
such as biology, the cognitive process, or social bias. For example, the difference in hormone 
testosterone level is an important biological difference between men and women. Since there is a 
negative link between risk-aversion and testosterone, and because men tend to have significantly 
higher levels of testosterone than women, women are usually perceived as more risk-averse than 
men (Sapienza, Zingales, & Maestripieri, 2009). On the other hand, studies on the cognitive 
process suggest that overconfidence is a result of self-serving attribution bias, i.e., the tendency 
to take too much credit for success and avoid blame for failure. Given that self-serving 
attribution bias is greater in men than in women, another perceived gender-based difference is 
that men are more overconfident than women (e.g., Beyer, 1990). Finally, social bias – gender 
stereotyping — identifies women as lacking the masculine stereotypical competencies (such as 
task-orientation, aggressiveness, and ambition) to become successful managers (Powell & 
Butterfield, 1989). 
Due to such gender differences, we propose five hypotheses to explain the reaction of 
investors to a CFO appointment and the post-hiring firm performance. These are: the 
overconfidence, risk-aversion, self-selection, androgyny, and gender bias hypotheses, described 





2.2.  Hypotheses Development 
2.2.1.  Hypotheses on Investors’ Response 
 Previous studies employing samples of CEOs show that the stock price response to a 
female CEO appointment is either significantly lower (Lee & James, 2007) or insignificantly 
different (Martin, Nishikawa, & Williams, 2009) than that to a male CEO appointment. 
However, these results are either based on a small sample (only 17 female CEOs in the case of 
Lee and James (2007)) or do not account for the knowledge disparities among top executives 
such as educational credentials and experience (Martin et al., 2009). One of the contributions of 
this study is that I control for these two key factors that can influence performance while 
utilizing a large sample. 
To explain the reaction of investors to a female CFO appointment, I propose five 
different hypotheses. The overconfidence theory, which is increasingly attracting attention from 
academics and practitioners alike, refers to the cognitive bias of individuals to overestimate the 
accuracy of their knowledge and judgments (Griffin & Tversky, 1992). Some recent researchers 
also consider overconfidence to include the belief that outcomes will be favorable (Malmendier 
& Tate, 2008). Previous studies show that overconfidence is linked to a firm’s acquisition 
frequency (Billett & Qian, 2008; Huang & Kisgen, 2013, Levi, Li, & Zhang, 2014), size of 
acquisition premiums (Levi, Li, & Zhang, 2014; Malmendier & Tate, 2008), reporting quality 
(Schrand & Zechman, 2012), innovation (Hirshleifer, Low, & Teoh, 2012), and overinvestment 
(Goel & Thakor, 2008; Malmendier & Tate, 2008).  
Overconfidence may either reduce or increase firm value depending on the firm’s 
characteristics and prospects (Goel & Thakor, 2008). For example, to the extent that high growth 





likely to suffer from overinvestment (Goel & Thakor, 2008; Heaton, 2002), overconfidence 
confers benefits in dynamic environments but could lead to diminishing benefits in more stable 
settings. Accordingly, firms with lower growth opportunities may appreciate a moderate level of 
overconfidence in their executives, which would be enough to mitigate the overinvestment 
problem (Goel & Thakor, 2008). Conversely, firms in high growth industries, which tend to be 
adversely impacted by underinvestment, would value executives with a high level of 
overconfidence.  
Prior literature documents that while both women and men exhibit overconfidence, men 
are likely to be more overconfident than women (Barber & Odean, 2001). For example, Barber 
and Odean (2001) provide supporting evidence indicating that men trade more excessively than 
women. Huang and Kisgen (2013) document that male managers exhibit relative overconfidence 
in corporate decision making compared with female managers, represented by the higher 
likelihood of making value destroying acquisitions. Levi et al. (2014) find that female directors 
less overestimate merger gains. Hence, firms with female directors are less likely to make 
acquisitions and will pay lower bid premia if they do. Taken together, the above arguments lead 
us to conclude that investors would respond relatively more positively (or less negatively) to 
female CFO appointments at firms characterized by low growth opportunities, and vice versa. 
Appendix A presents a summary of predictions of all hypotheses. 
H1a: To the extent that women are less overconfident than men, the stock price response 
to the appointment of a female CFO will be relatively less favorable than that of a male 
CFO at firms with high growth opportunities. 
Regarding the gender-based difference in risk appetite, the predominant view is that 
women have a lower preference for risk in decision-making compared to men (Barsky et al., 
1997; Ittonen, Vähämaa, & Vähämaa, 2013). Accordingly, the risk-aversion hypothesis projects 





This body of literature posits that high managerial risk-aversion reduces firm value as it can lead 
to underinvestment relative to the shareholders’ risk preferences by forgoing risky but positive 
NPV projects (Easterbrook, 1984; Goel & Thakor, 2008; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).1  Hence, 
reflecting the inclination to avoid uncertainty, risk-aversion is expected to have a monotonically 
negative impact on firm value (Goel & Thakor, 2008). In other words, a female executive’s 
decisions are expected to be detrimental, though the degree of severity depends on the type of 
firm in which the executive works; more specifically, the underinvestment problem caused by 
managers’ risk-aversion would be more exacerbated at firms with high growth opportunities 
(Goel & Thakor, 2008). Consequently, the risk-aversion hypothesis predicts a negative response 
towards a female CFO appointment in both types of firms with a relatively more pronounced 
negative reaction when female CFO appointments are in high growth industries.   
H1b: To the extent that women are more risk-averse in their decision-making than men, 
the stock price response to the appointment of a female CFO will be relatively less 
favorable than that of a male CFO in both high and low growth environments, with a 
more pronounced negative response at firms with high growth prospects. 
The self-selection hypothesis suggests that gender differences among top executives are 
small or even non-existent. The rationale is that since only outstanding women can break the 
glass ceiling and get to the top positions, female executives thus are not representative of the 
female population at large (Kumar, 2010). Some empirical studies also document no differences 
in risk-taking behavior, decision quality, or competitiveness between male and female managers 
(Atkinson et al., 2003) and show that gender is not the determining factor in selecting top 
management executives (Jordan, Clark, & Waldron, 2007). In sum, the self-selection theory 
predicts that investors’ response to the hiring decision will not be based on gender.  
                                                 
1 While diversified investors are concerned only with non-diversifiable risk, managers have a substantial 





H1c: To the extent that there are no gender differences among top executives, the stock 
price response to the appointment of a female CFO will be similar to that of a male CFO. 
Advocates of the androgyny hypothesis propose that because both high masculinity and 
high femininity are positive traits, their combination would not only be better but would also 
produce a unique hybrid that goes beyond either masculinity or femininity. An androgynous 
leader is thus predicted to be competitive and assertive as well as compassionate and caring 
(Kark, Waismel-Manor, & Shamir, 2012). While the traditional leadership style, which 
emphasizes rational processes, values stereotypes of masculinity such as instrumentality and 
assertiveness, the transformational style, which highlights emotions and values, advocates 
androgyny due to its greater flexibility as well as adaptability (Berkery et al., 2013). Given that 
the latter is superior to the former and that women are more androgynous than men in nature 
(Berkery et al., 2013; Kark et al., 2012), the androgyny theory postulates that firms could benefit 
more from female executives. A female CFO hiring announcement, therefore, would be received 
favorably regardless of the type of firm the CFO joins. 
H1d: To the extent that women are more androgynous, the stock price response to the 
appointment of a female CFO will be relatively more favorable than that of a male CFO 
regardless of the firm’s environment. 
Finally, the theory of gender bias posits that, although the idea of a female leader has 
gained traction today, it is still not widely accepted. Indeed, because men are assumed to possess 
more characteristics required from a competent leader compared to women, investors may be 
more skeptical about the appointment of a female executive than that of a male executive. 
Studies in support of this view find that women are presumed to lack confidence in their 
financial abilities (Powell & Ansic, 1997), exert less influence than men (Wagner, Ford, & Ford, 
1986), and are perceived as less effective than men in similar positions (Powell & Butterfield, 





(Wagner et al., 1986), casting doubt on female executives’ competency. Further, because female 
executives are viewed as new and different than investors’ traditional notion of leaders, the 
appointment of a female executive may be met less favorably by investors than that of a male 
executive regardless of the firm’s environment.2  
H1e: In the presence of gender bias, the stock price response to the appointment of a 
female CFO will be relatively less favorable than that of a male CFO regardless of the 
firm’s environment. 
2.2.2.  Hypotheses on Firm Performance 
 While the two hypotheses of overconfidence and risk-aversion both predict that the 
attributes of female CFOs are more suitable in less risky environments, the implications for firm 
performance are not similar across the two hypotheses. According to the overconfidence 
framework, female CFOs, with their moderate level of overconfidence, would outperform their 
male counterparts in firms with lower growth opportunities while male CFOs, with their high 
level of overconfidence, are expected to be more successful in firms characterized by higher 
growth prospects.3 On the other hand, the risk-aversion theory suggests that because female 
executives are more risk-averse, they would underperform their male counterparts in both 
settings, though the underperformance would be less acute among low uncertainty firms. 
H2a: To the extent that women are less overconfident, firms hiring female (male) CFOs 
will exhibit a greater improvement in performance than those hiring male (female) 
CFOs in low (high) growth settings. 
 
                                                 
2 I note that a negative market reaction at the hiring of female CFOs for the whole sample cannot 
distinguish between inherent bias against women executives and the perception that they lack leadership 
qualities. 
3 Goel and Thakor (2008) argue that the threshold level of confidence above which overconfidence will 
adversely affect firm value will be higher for firms in riskier industries. Also, to the extent that 
competition for positive NPV projects is more intense within high growth industries (Gervais, Heaton, & 
Odean, 2007), overconfident executives who are more likely to underinvest in information gathering 





H2b: To the extent that women are more risk-averse in their decision-making, firms 
hiring female CFOs will exhibit a lesser improvement in performance than those hiring 
male CFOs relatively more so in high growth settings.  
 
Alternatively, given the argument that gender differences among top executives in an 
organization may be non-existent, the self-selection hypothesis posits no difference in firm 
performance between female and male CFOs. 
H2c: In the presence of no gender differences among top executives, firm hiring female 
CFOs will perform similarly to those hiring male CFOs. 
Conversely, based on the argument that a combination of masculinity and femininity 
would be superior to either individually and that women are naturally more androgynous than 
men (Berkery et al., 2013), the androgyny hypothesis predicts firms hiring female CFOs would 
experience better performance than those hiring male CFOs. 
H2d: To the extent that women are more androgynous, firms hiring female CFOs will 
exhibit a greater improvement in performance than those hiring male CFOs. 
Finally, as noted earlier, the gender bias theory views business leadership as a masculine 
job requiring the leader to be self-reliant, aggressive, competitive, and decisive while women are 
considered nurturing, sympathetic, gentle, and sensitive to the needs of others (Powell & 
Butterfield, 1989). Accordingly, women are perceived as lacking competence and influence to 
become a successful manager,4 which leads to the following hypothesis. 
H2e: To the extent that business leadership requires exclusively masculine traits, firms 
hiring female CFOs will exhibit a lesser improvement in performance than those hiring 
male CFOs. 
                                                 
4 It can be argued that firms are able to match on all criteria and hire the optimal executive, in which case 
there will be no significant association between CFO gender and firm performance. However, evidence in 
the literature indicates that boards do not always match executives on characteristics that fit the firm, 
which can be attributed to information asymmetry, adverse selection, and boards’ lack of the strategic 





2.2.3.  Hypotheses on Cash Holdings 
 Determining the level of cash holdings is one of the most important decisions made by 
the management, which has attracted considerable attention from academics and practitioners for 
a long period of time. Previous studies on corporate finance have provided a comprehensive 
analysis of determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings. A prevailing argument in 
the cash holdings literature is that, since cash is the most liquid asset and can be easily converted 
into private benefits, excessively accumulating cash can lead to an adverse impact on corporate 
performance. This is due to the relatively lower return on cash compared to real assets as well as 
the problem of managerial discretion, i.e., entrenched managers stockpile cash to increase their 
discretion and to avoid the discipline of capital markets at the expense of shareholders (Myers & 
Rajan, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1989). Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory posits that, even when the 
firm has poor investment opportunities, entrenched managers would rather retain cash than 
distribute it to shareholders, which is referred to in the literature as the agency motive. On the 
other hand, proponents of the precautionary motive argue that the prominent benefit of holding 
excess cash is to avoid underinvestment due to potentially costly external financing, e.g., when 
information asymmetry is high, equity is undervalued, or economic environment is highly 
volatile (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Almeida, Campello, & Weisbach, 2004; Acharya, Almeida, & 
Campello, 2007). 
Prior empirical work in the US documents mixed evidence on whether large cash 
reserves could be harmful to shareholders. For example, Opler et al. (1999) find evidence 
suggesting that precautionary motive, rather than managerial discretion, appears to be a valid 
explanation for the managers’ behavior of accumulating cash, i.e., to ensure that firms have 





Their results are supported by Mikkelson and Partch (2003) who show that persistent policies of 
large cash reserves neither lead to poor performance nor represent a conflict between managers 
and stockholders' interests, but instead are accompanied by greater growth in assets and 
investment, which enhance firm value.  
On the contrary, Harford (1999) find that cash-rich firms are more likely to make value-
destroying acquisitions, which is consistent with the free cash flow theory. In a later study, 
Harford et al. (2008) go further by pointing out that the combination of excess cash and weak 
governance leads to suboptimal investment decisions, lowering profitability and valuations. 
Supportively, Faulkender and Wang (2006) document that the marginal value of cash declines 
with larger cash holdings, while Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) show that this is a problem 
only of firms with weak corporate governance. 
Arguing that the mixed evidence in the US is the result of the lack of sufficient variation 
in the agency conflict across firms, some researchers examine the link between cash holdings 
and agency conflict from an international perspective. Cross-country evidence indicates a 
negative relation between shareholder rights and cash holdings (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, & 
Servaes, 2003; Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 2006). More importantly, in countries where 
shareholder rights are weak, firm value decreases with cash holdings (Kalcheva & Lins, 2007). 
Overall, cross-country evidence supports the free cash flow hypothesis and agency motive, 
suggesting shareholders should be concerned about large cash reserves. 
Since overconfident managers tend to overestimate future returns, they believe their firms 
are undervalued by the market. As a result, overconfident managers prefer relying on internally 
generated cash flows and accumulate excess cash because they perceive external financing as 





showing a positive link between overconfidence and cash reserves. For example, Hirshleifer et 
al. (2012) document that firms lead by overconfident CEOs have relatively higher cash to assets. 
Huang-Meier, Lambertides, and Steeley (2016) also show that overconfident managers hold 
more cash, especially in bad times, than rational managers.  
In contrast, Deshmukh, Goel, and Howe (2017) find that overconfident CEOs hold 
relatively less cash than rational CEOs. They argue that overconfidence CEOs, who believe that 
external financing is overly costly but expect this cost to reduce over time, delay raising outside 
funds and use internal cash to fund investment opportunities, resulting in lower cash reserves. 
Therefore, I must be cautious when interpreting the results. Taken together, I expect male CFOs 
to hold more excess cash than female CFOs on average, which can be attributed to the 
precautionary motive.  
On the other hand, whether women have different ethical sensitivities and standards than 
men is a controversial topic in the gender literature. A popular strand of the gender-ethics theory 
documents that women are more concerned about ethical issues such as disclosure, integrity, and 
conflict of interests than men (Ho, Li, Tam, & Zhang, 2015; Tyson, 1990). Other researchers 
further argue that women do not only adopt higher ethical standards but also apply a different 
moral reasoning process than men (French & Weis, 2000). In particular, women tend to employ 
“ethics of care,” emphasizing nurturing, empathy, and caring for others, while men tend to 
employ “ethics of justice”, emphasizing equality, principles, and results (Lee, Pillutla, & Law, 
2000). For example, women are more likely to exhibit ethical behavior in the workplace than 
men (Bernardi & Arnold 1997; Lund 2008). Tyson (1990) and Larkin (2000) also show that 
female managers and female internal auditors are also more conservative in their ethical 





costs, Jurkus, Park, & Woodard (2011) find that female officers help alleviate the agency 
problem in firms operating in less competitive markets. Ho et al. (2015) find that female CEOs 
improve financial reporting quality, which can be partly attributed to their stronger ethical 
disposition. 
Agency conflicts arise when managers do not act in the best interests of shareholders 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). If the gender-ethics hypothesis holds, (i.e., women have higher ethical 
sensitivities), female managers may extract less in private benefits than male counterparts such 
that their decisions are more in line with shareholders’ interests, thereby mitigating the agency 
problems. Particularly, since accumulating cash is considered a problem of managerial discretion 
(Jensen, 1986), I expect female managers, with a weaker agency motive for holding cash, to have 
relatively less excess cash reserves than their male counterparts. I note that while both the 
overconfidence hypothesis and gender-ethics hypothesis predict a negative relation between 
female manager presentation and excess cash holdings, the motives behind them are different. 
H3a: To the extent that women are less overconfident or women have higher ethical 
sensitivities than men, firms hiring female CFOs will exhibit a greater reduction in excess 
cash holdings than those hiring male CFOs. 
Given that greater managerial risk-aversion leads to the adoption of safer corporate policy 
by holding greater cash balances (Chava & Purnanandam, 2010), if female managers exhibit 
preference for less risk, they should be more likely to increase cash balances or maintain more 
 excess cash than their male counterparts. In their empirical study of Chinese listed firms, 
Zeng and Wang (2015) show that firms led by female CEOs hold a higher level of cash holdings 
compared to those led by male CEOs. They argue that female CEOs are more concerned with the 
precautionary motive and care less about the opportunity cost of cash. Overall, the risk-aversion 





H3b: To the extent that women are more risk-averse in their decision-making, firms 
hiring female CFOs will exhibit a greater increase in excess cash holdings than those 
hiring male CFOs. 
Finally, self-selection hypothesis posits no difference in the changes in cash holdings 
between firms hiring female CFOs and those hiring male CFOs. 
H3c: In the presence of no gender differences among top executives, the changes in cash 
holdings at firms with excess cash following the appointment of female CFOs should be 






















CHAPTER 3: SAMPLE, DATA, AND RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1.  Sample Formation and Data Sources 
 The data collection process starts with the universe of S&P 1500 firms in ExecuComp 
during the period 1994–2016 (including performance period). A manager is classified as a CFO 
if his/her title is composed of phrases such as “chief financial officer,” “chief finance officer,” 
“CFO” and other similar titles. I also verify from various sources the first year an executive 
became the CFO for a specific company. I eliminate all interim or acting CFOs and CFOs for 
whom the information available from public sources contradicted that available in ExecuComp. 
To remain in the sample, the new CFO must stay with the firm at least two years subsequent to 
the appointment. I exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) because they tend to have 
distinct structure of expense, investment, and financial policies (Almeida, Cunha, Ferreira, & 
Restrepo, 2017; Banker, Basu, Byzalov, & Chen, 2016).   
In order to conduct the event-study (stock price response) analysis, I identify the earliest 
date of a CFO appointment announcement by searching articles related to the company in the 
financial press. Finally, firms are required to have financial information and stock return data in 
the COMPUSTAT database and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) files, 
respectively. The final sample is composed of 1,349 CFO appointments over a 21-year period; 
firm performance data is required for two years following appointment. Thus, the sample data 
covers 1994-2016. 
3.2.  Stock Market Response Method 
Dependent variable. To measure the stock market response to a CFO hiring 
announcement, I apply event-study analysis and examine the cumulative abnormal returns 





days from day -250 to day -51. Daily abnormal stock return for each sample firm is calculated by 
taking the difference between the firm’s observed return and the estimated return from the 
estimated market model. Three-day CARs (-1, +1) is calculated for each firm by cumulating 
these daily abnormal returns. I exclude firms with confounding corporate events (such as 
mergers and acquisitions, earnings announcements, etc.). In the multivariate analysis, I estimate 
cross-sectional regressions explaining the three-day announcement period CARs (-1, +1) using 
various specifications of the following model. 
CARsi,t = β0 + β1(Female CFO)i,t + β2-7(CFO controls)i,t + β8Assets1i,t-1 + β9Perfi,t-1  
            + β10-13(Reasons for prior CFO departure)i,t + εi,t                                       (1)    
The variable Female CFO is the test variable, which equals one if the gender of the new 
CFO is female, and zero otherwise. 
Firm control variables. Year fixed-effects are included in all models to control for 
macroeconomic effects. I also control for firm characteristics such as Assets1 (measured as the 
natural logarithm of total assets) to proxy for firm size and Perf, which is measured as net cash 
flow less extraordinary items scaled by the previous year’s total assets, to proxy for firm 
performance. Variables are winsorized at one percent cutoff at both tails to limit the influence of 
outliers and industry adjusted to control for industry effects. Specifically, I subtract the industry-
median calculated annually using the Global Industry Classifications Standard (GICS) system 
(Bhojraj, Lee, & Oler, 2003) from the sample firm value to control for the industry effects for 
each firm-year. 
CFO control variables. To control for CFOs’ characteristics, I collect their biographical 
information, such as educational profile, prior job experience, age of the executive, and whether 
the CFO comes from inside the firm. These variables are collected from multiple sources such as 





variable MBA, which takes a value of one if the CFO has an MBA, and zero otherwise. Second, 
CFOs are recorded as having broad managerial experience if they had previously served in any 
of the following roles: CEO, Chief Operating Officer, President, Executive Vice President, 
Senior Vice President, General Manager, Deputy President, Executive Director, Corporate Vice 
President, Managing Director, Executive Director, Vice Chairman with administration duties, or 
any C-Suite executive, including General Counsel. The variable MGT-EXP thus denotes 
presence or absence of managerial experience based on the description above.  
I create two variables that reflect whether the CFO has an accounting or finance 
background. The variable representing an accounting background, ACC-BKG, takes a value of 
one if the CFO had previous accounting experience, a Certified Public Accountant certification 
(CPA), a Certified Management Accountant (CMA), or a degree specialized in accounting, and 
zero otherwise. A CFO is considered to have accounting experience is he previously held the 
following positions – Principal Accounting Officer, Chief Accounting Officer, Treasurer, 
Controller, Senior Auditor, Auditor, Vice President of Accounting, Director of Corporate 
Accounting, etc. The second variable reflects a finance background, FIN-BKG, and takes a value 
of one if the CFO had previous finance experience, a Chartered Financial Analyst certification 
(CFA), or a finance degree, and zero otherwise. A CFO is also considered to have finance 
experience if he held positions such as Vice President of Finance, Financial Analyst, Director of 
Financial Planning, Finance Manager, Finance Director, etc. 
Additional CFO characteristic variables that I include are Was-CFO, CFO Age, and 
Insider. The variable Was-CFO indicates whether the executive held a CFO position previously. 
CFO Age proxies for the executive’s years of experience. Insider denotes whether the CFO was 





I also collect information on the reason for the departure of the previous CFO from 
financial press articles. I incorporate four indicator variables that denote whether the prior CFO – 
(i) retired, (ii) took another job, (iii) was fired, or (iv) was promoted within the firm. I define 
fired as those CFOs who were outright fired due to fraud or resigned due to other reasons apart 
from obtaining another job.  
Finally, I separate my sample into high and low growth opportunities firms based on the 
industry-median market-to-book (MTB) for the year prior to the appointment (Hutchinson & Gul, 
2004) classified according to the Global Industry Classifications Standard (GICS) system. First, 
for all nonfinancial firms in COMPUSTAT and for the year prior to the appointment, I compute 
a median MTB for each industry (industry-median MTB) based on six-digit GICS codes. Second, 
from the sample of all 63 industry-median MTBs, I obtain a year-median MTB. Firms that belong 
to the industries whose industry-median MTBs lies above the year-median MTB are considered 
high growth firms, and low growth firms otherwise. 
3.3.  Firm Operating Performance Method  
 To assess the link between female CFOs and firm performance, I employ the following 
equation that also includes year fixed-effects to rule out the impact of potential unobservable 
year-specific effects. Different versions of this model are utilized to test the different hypotheses. 
ΔPerfi,t = β0 + β1(Female CFO)i,t + β2-8(CFO controls)i,t + β9-17(Firm controls)i,t-1 + εi,t (2)                                                                
 Dependent variable. I compute the dependent variable ΔPerf as the change in corporate 
performance from the year prior to the CFO appointment (t-1) to two years subsequent to the 
appointment (t+2). Performance is measured as net cash flow less extraordinary items scaled by 





changes to net working capital and other items (Banker, Huang, & Natarajan, 2009) because it is 
less subject to distortion than earnings.  
Control variables. I control for firm characteristics that may influence performance such 
as assets, leverage, growth opportunity, liquidity, research and development (R&D), dividends, 
capital expenditure, firm volatility, and firm complexity (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Cazavan-Jeny, 
Jeanjean, & Joos, 2011; Jensen, Lundstrum, & Miller, 2010). Assets1 measures firm size, 
calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage1 represents the ratio of long-term 
debt to total assets. I utilize MTB as a proxy for growth opportunities. MTB1 is computed as the 
book value of assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of the equity, scaled by 
total book value of assets. Liquidity is reflected by the proportion of cash and marketable 
securities to total assets and is a measure for internal funds available for investment. R&D, 
representing firm’s innovation strategy, is computed as the ratio of research and development 
expenditure to sales. Div, measured as the sum of dividends from preferred and common stock 
scaled by total assets, gauge the degree of financial constraints (where the higher the ratio, the 
lower the financial constraints the firm is subject to). Capex1 represents the ratio of capital 
expenditure to total assets and reflects the degree to which the firm relies on fixed assets. To 
control for firm complexity, I use the variable, No_SIC, which is the number of primary SIC 
codes assigned to the firm. In addition, I also include a measure of risk, namely, idiosyncratic 
risk (Vol), which is defined as the sum of the squared residual from the Fama-French’s (1993) 
three-factor model using the daily return data from CRSP. My results are robust to the use of 
different measures of volatility. 
All firm control variables are measured as of the fiscal year-end prior to the CFO 





also industry-adjust firm control variables and the performance metric to control for industry 
effects. P-values are calculated using White’s heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. 
3.4.  Excess Cash Holdings Method 
 Following Opler et al. (1999), I estimate a firm’s excess cash holdings as the residual 
from the following model. 
 Cashi,t = Assets2i,t + NWCi,t + MTB2i,t + Cfi,t + Capex2i,t + Acqi,t + Leverage2i,t  
           + Div_dummyi,t                           (3) 
 Given that cash holdings vary considerably across industries, I estimate Equation 3 for 
each industry (three-digit SIC code) and control for macroeconomic effects using the year fixed-
effects (Harford, 1999). A firm with positive excess cash holdings (positive residual) is the one 
that holds more cash than the optimal level estimated by Equation 3 in that year. In contrast, a 
firm with negative excess cash holdings (negative residual) is the one that has less cash than 
necessary to operate. I define cash-rich (cash-poor) firms as those having greater than one 
standard deviation of the time-series of the firm’s cash holdings above (below) that predicted by 
Equation 3 for any year. The remains are normal firms. 
 Next, I examine the impact of the new CFO gender on cash holding policies using 
Equation 4, including year and industry dummies to control for potential year and industry 
effects. ExCash is the residual from the regression of Equation 3. The dependent variable 
ΔExCash thus represents the change in excess cash holdings from the year prior to the CFO 
appointment (t-1) to two years subsequent to the appointment (t+2). All firm control variables 
are measured as of the fiscal year-end prior to the CFO appointment and winsorized at one 
percent cutoff at both tails to limit the influence of outliers. P-values are calculated using White’s 






ΔExCashi,t = β0 + β1(Female CFO)i,t + β2-8(CFO controls)i,t  + β9-16(Firm controls)i,t-1  
      + εi,t                                                                                                                  (4) 
3.5.  Robustness Checks 
3.5.1. Propensity Score Matching Technique 
 To the extent that female CFOs may not be randomly appointed if they self-select into 
certain types of firms, I need to correct for this potential selection bias. One of the primary 
methods I use is the propensity score matching method (Faulkender & Yang, 2010; Iskandar-
Datta & Jia, 2013, Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, & Zhang, 2011). In this approach, for each female 
CFO firm in my sample, I identify a matched firm that is as similar to the firm hiring the female 
CEO with the exception that it hired a male CFO. I begin with a logistic regression (Equation 5), 
which includes firm characteristics that may explain the decision to hire a female versus a male 
CFO. 
Probi,t (Female CFO = 1) = β0 + β1Assets1i,t-1 + β2Leverage1i,t-1 + β3Liquidityi,t-1  
    + β4R&Di,t-1 + β5MTB1i, t-1 + β6Dividendsi,t-1 + β7No_SICi,t-1  
    + β8Capex1i,t-1 + β9Voli,t-1 + εi,t           (5)      
I use a matching algorithm that does not allow for replacement to avoid the potential 
issue that replaced observations with extreme propensity scores are matched many times and 
thus, heavily weighted (Lawrence et al., 2011; Shipman, Swanquist, & Whited, 2016).5  
Particularly, I match the male CFO firms (the control firms) with the female CFO firms (the 
treated firms) using the estimated propensity scores. The propensity score matching sample is 
expected to circumvent effects of sample selection bias on my results. 
3.5.2. Heckman’s Two-Stage Model 
 To address the potential self-selection concern in which female CFOs may not be 
randomly assigned to firms, I conduct an alternative robustness test utilizing Heckman’s (1979) 
                                                 





two-stage model (Francis et al. 2013).6 The first stage is a probit regression examining the 
likelihood of appointing a female CFO as in Equation 5. 
 In the second stage, I estimate an OLS regression as described in Equations 2 and 4 but 
include the Inverse Mills Ratio, obtained from the first stage, as an extra explanatory variable, 
thereby removing the part of the error term correlated with the explanatory variable and avoiding 
the bias. The main purpose of this approach is to control for the endogeneity of a female CFO 
appointment by ensuring that unobservables in the first stage and those in the second stage are 
unrelated. An insignificant Inverse Mills Ratio indicates that the data does not suffer from 
selection bias. On the other hand, a significant coefficient on this ratio implies that a sample 
selection bias would have been an issue without the Heckman procedure. 
3.5.3. Difference-in-Differences Approach 
 Another robustness test to evaluate whether female CFOs exert significant influence on 
firm performance is the difference-in-differences approach (Equations 6 and 7). Following 
Huang and Kisgen (2013), my test sample (dif-in-dif sample) includes firm years three years 
before and three years after an appointment, excluding the year of the appointment, thereby 
increasing the sample size and alleviating serial correlation bias (Bertrand, Duflo, & 
Mullainathan, 2004). 
Perfi,t = β0 + β1(Postt x Female CFOi,t) + β2(Female CFO)i,t + β3Postt  
          + β4-10(Firm controls)i,t-1 + εi,t                      (6)     
            
Post is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if year t is after the appointment, 
and zero otherwise. The test variable, Post * Female CFO, reflects the impact of female CFOs 
on post-hiring firm performance. 
                                                 






3.5.4. Mover Dummy Variable Method 
 I also adopt the mover dummy variable (MDV) method to verify the impact of the CFO 
on firm performance (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2012). First, I create a 
subsample which is restricted only to movers, i.e., executives who have changed firms. This 
subsample is composed of all firms an executive had worked for previously (as a TMT member), 
collected from ExecuComp, and the CFO hiring firms. I exclude firms that have missing data on 
COMPUSTAT and those in which the executive stayed less than two years. The final subsample 
has 308 observations (referred to as the mover sample). Second, I investigate whether the 
executive plays a significant role in explaining the change in firm performance by comparing the 
adjusted R2 between two specifications, one without the executive fixed effects (Equation 8) and 
one with the executive fixed effects (Equation 9). Year fixed effects are included in both models. 
ΔPerfi,t = β0 + β1Assets1i,t-1 + β2Leverage1i,t-1 + β3Liquidityi,t-1 + β4R&Di,t-1 + β5Divi,t-1 + εi,t  (7) 
 
ΔPerfi,t = β0 + β1Assets1i,t-1 + β2Leverage1i,t-1 + β3Liquidityi,t-1 + β4R&Di,t-1m+ β5Divi, t-1 + CFO 
      + εi,t                                                            (8) 
where CFO are executive fixed effects, which capture the time-invariant or slow-moving 
CFO heterogeneity. The change in corporate performance is as defined earlier. The results from 
the second regression test whether executive attributes have a bearing on firm performance. To 
examine the impact of gender on firm performance, I go further by regressing the previously 
estimated fixed effects (CFO) on the CFO gender and other time-invariant (slow-moving) CFO 
traits such as education, year of birth, and the year of appointment (Graham et al., 2012) as 
shown in Equation 10. A significant coefficient on Female CFO variable would imply the 
important contribution of female CFOs to the change in firm performance. 
Executive fixed effects in performance = β0 + β1(Female CFO)i,t + β2-6(CFO Controls)i,t  





3.5.5. Buy-and-Hold Returns Method 
 In an additional test of firm performance, I compare the change in buy-and-hold returns 
(ΔBHR) between firms hiring female CFOs and those hiring male CFOs. The, ΔBHR is measured 
as the difference between 12-month buy-and-hold returns starting from the month after the 
appointment, and 12-month buy-and-hold returns prior to the appointment (ending in the month 
prior to the appointment). 
BHR = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡) −  1
𝑇
𝑡=1 , T = 12            (10) 
where Ri,t is the monthly return of i, period t. 
Further, to address the potential concern that firms hiring female CFOs may differ in 
attributes from those hiring male CFOs, I compare the change in buy-and-hold returns of female 
CFO firms with the propensity score matched sample of male CFO firms. To do so, I utilize the 
sample of control firms obtained from the propensity score methodology (described earlier) that 
minimizes the difference between female CFO firms and control male CFO firms on multiple 
dimensions. 
Finally, following Barber and Lyon (1997), I also examine the change in industry-
adjusted buy-and-hold returns (ΔBHAR) for the two groups of firms—those hiring female CFOs 
and those hiring male CFOs. To calculate BHAR, I subtract the return of the benchmark, the 49 
Fama and French (1997) industry groupings returns, RFF, from the raw returns. 
BHAR = [∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)]
𝑇
𝑡=1  − [∏ (1 + 𝑅𝐹𝐹,𝑡)]
𝑇









CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of CFO characteristics and firm characteristics as of 
the fiscal year-end prior to the appointment. For our sample of CFOs, we find that approximately 
9.6% are female, similar to Francis et al. (2015). In general, on a univariate basis, female CFOs 
tend to be younger than male CFOs, join firms that have greater cash holdings, lower leverage, 
lower capital expenditure, and are less complex.  
With regards to the educational credentials, approximately a half of the male (51.52%) 
and female CFOs (49.23%) hold MBA degrees. The proportions of CFOs who previously have 
top managerial experience and/or held a CFO position in the female group (33.85% and 49.23%, 
respectively) are smaller than in the male group (35.03% and 52.75%, respectively). On the other 
hand, the percentages of female CFOs with accounting and/or finance experience (71.54% and 
56.15%, respectively) are higher than those of male CFOs (65.55% and 50.04%). However, these 
differences are not statistically significant. 
4.2. Stock Market Response and CFO Gender 
 In this section, I investigate investors’ response to the appointment of a female CFO by 
conducting a multivariate analysis (see Equation 1) that controls for CFO qualifications and 
experience, firm characteristics, and the reason behind the departure of the previous CFO. 
Results are presented in Table 2. For the full sample, the negative coefficients on Female CFO in 
Models 1 and 2 (p-values of 0.10 and 0.12, respectively) indicate that market participants appear 
to respond more negatively to the appointment of a female CFO than to that of a male CFO 
(although the economic magnitude is relatively small). This evidence rules out the self-selection 





female CFOs and the androgynous hypothesis (H1d) which predicts a more positive reaction to 
female hiring announcements.  
Next, when I estimate regressions separately for the two sub-samples of high growth 
(Models 3 and 4) and low growth firms (Models 5 and 6), I find the coefficients on Female CFO 
are negative and significant in all models for high growth firms (each with a p-value of 0.01) but 
insignificant in all models for low growth firms (p-values of 0.53 and 0.52). These findings 
suggest that investors react differently to the appointment of a female CFO depending on the 
firm’s operating environment. Even though the price response to female appointment is negative 
for the whole sample, the fact that the same is not true for both subsets of firms does not support 
the gender bias hypothesis (H1e) nor the risk-aversion hypothesis (H1b). The above results are 
consistent with the overconfidence hypothesis (H1a) which implies that investors respond 
negatively to female CFO appointments at high growth firms if they believe female CFOs, with 
their moderate level of overconfidence, will not take enough risks to alleviate the 
underinvestment deficiency). In other words, investors view male CFOs with overconfidence as 
more suitable in volatile environments.  
Evidence from the propensity score sample (Models 7–9) shows that while the impact of 
CFO gender on stock price reaction is insignificant for the full sample and the low growth sub-
sample, investors respond relatively more negatively to a female CFO hiring announcement 
(coefficient of -0.015 and p-value of 0.05) at firms in high growth industries, supporting the 
notion that female CFOs’ low level of overconfidence is perceived as more appropriate for firms 
with low growth prospects. Overall, the results demonstrate that investors perceive female CFOs 





4.3. CFO Gender and Firm Performance 
To examine the association between CFO gender and firm performance, I estimate 
Equation 2 and present the results in Table 3. Evidence for the whole sample (Model 1) 
demonstrates a positive and significant link (p-value of 0.05) between the female CFO hiring 
decision and subsequent firm performance. This finding does not corroborate H2b, H2c and H2e, 
implying that the risk-aversion, self-selection, and gender bias hypotheses cannot explain the link 
between CFO gender and firm performance. 
In Models 4 and 7, which distinguish between overconfidence (H2a) and androgyny 
(H2d), evidence shows a significantly positive association between female CFO appointments 
and firm performance in low growth firms (p-value of 0.06), but an insignificant relation in the 
high growth sub-sample (p-value of 0.27). These findings do not support the androgyny 
hypothesis, which predicts enhanced performance in both growth environments. However, the 
results corroborate H2a.  
This result may be due to the fact that some CFO appointments do not reflect a change in 
gender (i.e., a new male CFO replaces an outgoing male CFO).7 To further explore the impact of 
male CFO on firm performance among high growth firms, I create a variable Female_to_Male, 
which equals one if the CFO appointment reflects a transition from a female to a male executive, 
and zero otherwise. The untabulated results show that a newly appointed male CFO, when 
replacing a female CFO, significantly helps enhance operating performance of high growth 
firms, consistent with H2a. In sum, these findings support the overconfidence hypothesis only.  
To address the concern that the results may be due to the benefits of gender-diverse 
TMTs or gender-diverse boards and not the gender of the CFO, I disentangle the influence of 
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CFO gender from that of gender diversity by creating two new variables: (i) TMT-GD takes the 
value of one if there is at least one female member in the TMT (excluding the CFO), and zero 
otherwise, and (ii) Board-GD equals one if there is at least one female director (excluding the 
CFO), and zero otherwise. Results presented in Models 2, 5, and 8 of Table 3 show that the 
coefficients on Female CFO are still significantly positive for all firms and for low growth firms 
(p-values of 0.03 and 0.10, respectively), but insignificant for high growth firms (p-value of 
0.14), supporting H2a. 
I also control for the impact of the board and the CEO on firm performance by 
incorporating Boardsize (the number of directors in the board) and CEO Tenure (the number of 
years the CEO has been in the position). CEO tenure is a measure of entrenchment (Berger, 
Ofek, and Yermack 1997) since long-tenured CEOs may focus on accumulating managerial 
power rather than maximizing shareholders’ wealth. Results are presented in Models 3, 6, and 9 
of Table 3. The significantly positive coefficients on Female CFO in Models 3 and 9 (p-values of 
0.03 and 0.08, respectively) again confirm the improvement in operating performance achieved 
by female CFOs at low growth firms.8   
For robustness, I employ another proxy for dynamism of firm’s environment, namely, 
research and development expenditures. I re-estimate Equation 2 for two sub-samples 
categorized based on the median R&D to sales ratio (Hagedoorn, 2002). The unreported results 
indicate robustness to this classification of uncertainty. Moreover, all my findings are invariant 
to using the SIC for industry adjustment instead of GICS. 
                                                 
8 In unreported tests, I replace TMT-GD by the percentage of female members in the TMT (excluding the 
CFO) and replace Board-GD by the percentage of female directors in the board (excluding the CFO). I 
also include the variable Female CEO and CEO-MBA to control for the impact of CEO gender and 





As an additional robustness check, I employ market capitalization instead of assets as a 
proxy for firm size, and the number of business segments instead of The number of primary SIC 
codes assigned to the firm as a proxy for complexity. The results (untabulated) are consistent 
with those from Table 3.  
Prior studies suggest that women tend to show higher anxiety in circumstances of 
uncertainty (Fehr-Duda, De Gennaro, & Schubert, 2006) which may adversely impact their 
performance perhaps due to underinvestment (Barsky, Juster, Kimball, & Shapiro, 1997). 
However, Rost and Osterloh’s (2010) argument that such situations can lead to less biased 
financial decision-making, combined with a female (male) attribute of paying more (less) 
attention to current state would result in females outperforming male counterparts.  
To examine performance in situations of great uncertainty, we take advantage of the 
financial crisis (2007-2009) by creating a dummy variable which equals one for 2007-2009 
period, and zero otherwise. The coefficient on the interaction term between this variable and 
Female CFO (unreported) indicates that female CFOs significantly underperformed male CFOs 
during the financial crisis, suggesting that female CFOs perform worse when uncertainty 
increases (Barsky et al., 1997). 
4.4. CFO Gender and Excess Cash Holdings 
To examine the effect of the new CFO gender on the change in excess cash holdings, I 
estimate regressions (Equation 4) separately for each type of firms (cash-rich, cash-poor, and 
normal firms). Table 4 shows that the newly appointed female CFOs tend to relatively reduce the 
excess cash holdings in cash-rich firms relative to their male counterparts (coefficient of -0.387 
and p-value of 0.04), consistent with H3a. The gender of the CFO does not have statistically 





0.92 and 0.57, respectively). However, this result does not allow me to distinctly attribute the 
impact of female CFO on excess cash holdings to either her being less overconfidence, having 
more ethical sensitivities, or both.9 
4.5. Robustness Checks 
4.5.1. Probability of Hiring a Female CFO 
There is a potential concern that female CFOs may not be randomly hired; for example, 
there is a possibility that female CFOs may be hired by more successful firms or firms that have 
been doing poorly and are at the cusp of improvement. To address this unobserved hiring 
orientation, I apply a logistic model to identify the connection between the hiring decision and 
firm characteristics and, in particular, include firm performance prior to hiring of the CFO. I also 
include a number of variables that proxy for uncertainty such as the market-to-book ratio, R&D 
intensity, and firm volatility.    
In addition to various firm characteristic variables, I also include CEO Tenure and TMT-
GD-Yr-1, a dummy variable that takes a value of one if there is at least one female member in the 
TMT in the year prior to the appointment, and zero otherwise.  
Table 5 reveals some interesting information regarding the CFO hiring decision. First, the 
decision to appoint a female CFO is not related to past performance as exhibited in the 
coefficients on Perf which are statistically insignificant. This applies to the whole sample as well 
as in high and low growth sub-samples. These findings imply that better post-hiring performance 
of female CFOs is not driven by firm’s ability to generate profits or a poorly performing firm at 
the cusp of a turnaround. Second, the logistic regression for the full sample shows no evidence 
                                                 
9 It can be argued that female CFOs reduce the excess cash holdings because they are risk-averse and 
make suboptimal decisions, e.g., reduce capital expenditure or lower leverage. However, I find no 
evidence indicating that firms hiring female CFO subsequently decline capital expenditure or decrease 





that the risk profile of firms has any bearing on the hiring decision as all the coefficients on the 
three proxies of uncertainty (market-to-book ratio, R&D intensity, and firm volatility) are 
insignificant. The results are similar and robust when I use alternative variables such as replacing 
Perf with ROA (returns on total assets) and Vol with systematic risk.10   
While the results show that firms are more likely to appoint a female CFO when there is 
at least a female member in the TMT (with p-values of 0.01 or better), my findings for the whole 
sample support the notion that the change in firm performance subsequent to the appointment 
can be attributed to the new CFO’s value and ability rather than joining a certain type of firm.11 
Next, I address potential endogeneity concerns through a variety of alternative 
approaches such as the propensity score technique, Heckman’s two-stage model, MDV, and 
difference-in-differences method. 
4.5.2. Propensity Score Matching Technique and Heckman’s Two-Stage Model 
I re-estimate Equation 2 using the propensity score sample. After matching firms that 
hired female CFOs with firms that have almost identical characteristics but hired male CFOs, I 
find that female CFOs outperform in firms that operate in low uncertainty environments. 
Evidence from Models 1–3 of Table 6A is very similar to earlier results, and is supportive of 
H2a. 
In line with Francis et al. (2013), I employ Heckman’s (1979) two-stage model as an 
alternative method to address the concern that female CFOs may not be randomly assigned to 
firms. The first stage is a probit regression examining the likelihood of appointing a female CFO 
                                                 
10 I also examined the impact of gender-diverse boards on the CFO hiring decisions and found no 
significant relation between female director representation and the likelihood of appointing a female CFO. 
11 I also estimate another model that includes a dummy variable that reflects whether the firm had at least 
one accounting restatement in the two years prior to the appointment (obtained from Audit Analytics). I 
find no association between a firm’s past accounting restatements and the hiring decision which implies 





(Table 6A – Stage 1). In the second stage, I estimate Equation 2 using an OLS regression that 
also includes the Inverse Mills Ratio obtained from the first stage. The results in Table 6A 
reaffirm my findings that the female CFO appointment has a positive link with subsequent firm 
performance as the coefficient on Female CFO is positive and significant (p-value of 0.08) even 
after including the Inverse Mills Ratio. The insignificant Inverse Mills Ratio indicates that there 
is no systematic selection bias in my sample. The results from the Heckman two-stage model are 
preserved after controlling for CEO tenure, CEO gender, and TMT gender diversity 
(unreported).  
To control for the influence of the CEO on firm performance, I conduct an additional 
robustness test by deleting from the full sample firms that replaced their CEOs during the period 
year t to year t+2. My measure of change in firm performance for this subsample (which includes 
CEOs who have been at the firm from year t-1 to year t+2) thus controls for the CEO’s influence 
on firm performance. The results, presented in Models 4, 5, and 6 of Table 6A, remain 
supportive of the overconfidence hypothesis (H2a) as the coefficients on Female CFO are 
significantly positive in Models 4 and 6 with p-values of 0.06 and 0.02, respectively. 
I also employ the Heckman two-stage model to estimate the impact of female CFOs on 
the change in excess cash holdings. The results from Table 6B confirm my previous results 
indicating that new female CFOs relatively reduce the excess cash reserves in cash-rich firms. 
4.5.3. Difference-in-Differences Approach 
Table 7 presents the results of difference-in-differences regressions. Model 1 shows that 
post-hiring firm performance increases with a female CFO appointment as the coefficients on 
(Post * Female CFO) are positive and statistically significant (p-value of 0.04). When I take a 





the overconfidence story since female CFOs enhance the performance of only firms 
characterized by low uncertainty (coefficient of 1.673) (Model 3) while, in high growth firms, 
female CFOs exert no discernable influence (Model 2). Generally, the results of Table 7 are 
consistent with H2a. 
4.5.4. Mover Dummy Variable Method 
I verify the impact of CFO attributes on firm performance using the MDV method 
(Equations 7 and 8) on the mover sample (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Graham et al., 2012). Panel 
A shows that the adjusted R2 of the pooled OLS regression (without executive fixed effects) is 
4.2%. When the regression model is augmented with the executive fixed effects to take into 
account the time-invariant CFO characteristics, the adjusted R2 increases to 10.2%. This large 
increase in adjusted R2 suggests a substantial role to executive traits in determining firm 
performance and is consistent with Bertrand and Schoar (2003).  
Next, I go one step further by investigating whether gender has any contribution to firm 
performance by regressing the previously estimated executives fixed effects on the CFO gender 
as per Equation 9. In Models 1 and 2 in Panel B, the coefficients on Female CFO are always 
positive and significant (p-values of 0.02 and 0.01, respectively), indicating that female 
executives are positively associated with the performance fixed effects estimated. Overall, Table 
6 demonstrates an important role of time-invariant (slow-moving) CFO attributes on the change 
in firm performance following the appointment. Furthermore, among those attributes, the 
contribution of the CFO gender is significant, corroborating my earlier results. 
4.5.5. Overconfidence vs. Ethical Sensitivities 
 So far, the evidence shows that female CFOs are more likely to lower the excess cash in 





the impacts of overconfidence and ethical sensitivities are indistinguishable. Hence, this section 
aims to distinguish the impact of these two behavioral tendencies. 
 According to Bjuggren and Elert (2016), while women are less overconfident (optimistic) 
than men in general, gender differences in overconfidence disappear in sharp economic 
downturns for two reasons. First, people tend to process bad information more thoroughly than 
good information (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). Second, people are 
more confident when information is absent or ambiguous (Lenney, 1977; Barber and Odean, 
2001). However, in times of economic crisis, since information about the economy is abundant, 
men relatively lower their expectations about the present and future. Therefore, to distinct the 
impact of overconfidence and ethical sensitivities, I examine the relation between female CFO 
representation and cash holdings in both normal and crisis times. Accordingly, if the 
overconfidence hypothesis holds, female CFOs will relatively reduce excess cash holdings in 
cash-rich firms during normal times, but will behave in the same way as their male counterparts 
during the financial crises. In contrast, if the ethical sensitivities hypothesis holds, female CFOs 
will consistently lower excess cash in cash-rich firms compared to male CFOs in any situations. 
 Table 9 compares cash-rich firms’ excess cash holdings between those with female CFOs 
and those with male CFOs segmented by the type of economic conditions (all situations, normal 
situation, and financial crisis). I define the crisis period as 2007–2009, and the normal period (no 
crisis period) as 1994–2006 and 2010–2016. Panel A shows that in normal times, cash-rich firms 
with female CFOs have relatively lower excess cash reserves than those with male CFOs 
(significant at 1% level). However, during the financial crisis, the excess cash holding by firms 
with female CFOs is similar to those with male CFOs. Taking a closer look, I find that the 





change in behavior of both male and female CFOs. Particularly, male CFOs tend to reduce 
excess cash holdings while female male CFOs tend to increase excess cash holdings. As a 
robustness check, in Panel B of Table 9, I perform the analysis using the propensity score 
matching technique and the results hold. Overall, evidence in Table 9 is in support of the 
overconfidence hypothesis rather than the ethical sensitivities hypothesis as female CFOs’ 
behavior is not consistent across different economic conditions.  
4.6. CFO Gender and Buy-And-Hold Returns 
 As an additional measure of firm performance, I examine the impact of newly appointed 
CFO gender on the change in buy-and-hold returns following the appointment. The results in 
Table 10 show that firms in low growth industries with female CFOs experience a relatively 
better improvement in performance, represented by ΔBHR, than those hiring male CFOs. 
Particularly, firms hiring female CFOs enjoy an average increase of 13.2 percent in 12-month 
BHR compared to -1.6 percent at firms hiring male CFOs. The difference in the ΔBHR between 
firms hiring female CFOs and those hiring male CFOs is statistically significant. This result 
holds when I perform the analysis for the propensity score matching sample and when utilizing 
an industry-adjusted measure of the buy-and-hold returns (ΔBHAR), confirming the robustness of 
my main findings from firm operating performance. 
4.7. Female CFOs and Decision-Making that Affects Firm Performance 
 I examine potential channels through which female CFOs’ decisions are behind the 
improvement in firm performance—cost efficiency and working capital efficiency. Since women 
are considered more knowledgeable about price and more concerned about spending (Estelami, 
Lehmann, & Holden, 2001), better firm performance could be due to greater cost efficiency 





especially at low growth firms which are characterized by high levels of stability, strong detail-
orientation, and intense price competition (Chatman & Jehn, 1994). The two measures of cost 
efficiency that I employ are selling, general, and administrative expense (SG&A) and cost of 
goods sold (COGS), both scaled by total sales (winsorized and industry adjusted). These two 
variables are then formulated as the change in SG&A expense and the change in COGS from the 
year prior to the appointment of the CFO (t-1) to two years subsequent to the appointment (t+2). 
The results from Models 1–6 in Table 11 show that firms hiring female CFOs experience 
a significant reduction in SG&A relative to those hiring male CFOs in both high and low growth 
firms. I also find that female CFOs significantly reduce COGS which seems to be driven by 
improvements at high growth firms. Overall, the evidence supports the view that female CFOs 
increase firm performance by promoting cost efficiency. 
Second, working capital management (WCM) is one of the most fundamental decisions 
made by financial managers and is widely recognized to affect profitability. Prior studies have 
found a positive relation between WCM efficiency and profitability (e.g., Deloof, 2003; 
Lazaridis, 2006) and confirmed that benefits accrue to firms with a short cash conversion cycle.12 
To measure WCM efficiency, I employ two variables: days sales outstanding (DSO) and days 
inventory outstanding (DIO) (Deloof, 2003; Lazaridis, 2006), winsorized and industry adjusted. 
According to the traditional view of WCM (i.e., the shorter the cash conversion cycle, the greater 
is firm profitability), DSO and DIO are expected to be negatively associated with profitability. 
Hence, I predict a negative relation between Female CFO and the two dependent variables 
DSO and DIO, which are defined as the changes in DSO and DIO from the year prior to the 
appointment of the CFO to two years subsequent to hiring. Following Deloof and Jegers (1996), 
                                                 
12 A very instructive example illustrating the importance of WCM efficiency (Shin & Soenen, 1998) is the 





I control for firm size (Assets), days payable outstanding (DPO), the length of production time 
(Turnover), and short-term borrowing (Stborrow)—all measured as of the fiscal year-end prior to 
the CFO joining the firm. 
In Models 7–12 of Table 11, I find that female CFOs indeed lead to enhanced WCM 
efficiency by relatively shortening DSO. The coefficients on Female CFO are negative and 
significant for low growth firms (each with a p-value of 0.09) but not for high growth firms (p-
value of 0.94). However, CFO gender does not affect DIO. Robustness tests (unreported) using 
the propensity score sample or employing alternative measures of DSO and DIO (Deloof, 2003; 
Lazaridis, 2006) provide similar results. In sum, Table 11 shows that female CFOs improve low 
growth firms’ performance through the enhancement of cost efficiency (through SG&A) and 
WCM efficiency (through DSO). 
Huang and Kisgen (2013) document that female executives (CEOs and CFOs) tend to 
undertake fewer acquisitions and conclude the result is consistent with lower female 
overconfidence. In this study, I go one step further and examine the impact of gender-based 
differences in overconfidence on acquisitive behavior, while accounting for the operating 
environment. Data on acquisitions is obtained from SDC Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions 
database. I compute the number of acquisitions and the relative acquisition value made (or 
intended to be made) in the first two years following the appointment (t+1 and t+2). Relative 
acquisition value is measured as total deal value divided by the acquirer’s size, winsorized and 
industry adjusted. The t-test in Table 12 shows that firms with female CFOs tend to make fewer 
acquisitions and smaller acquisitions in terms of value than those hiring male CFOs only in low 





The differences in acquisitive behavior, which can be attributed to female CFOs’ lower 
overconfidence, is one factor that could have contributed to the better performance in low growth 
firms. Given that firms with low growth opportunities are more likely to engage in value-
destroying acquisitions (Lang, Stulz, & Walkling, 1991; Servaes, 1991), the results show low 
growth firms (versus high growth firms) can benefit more from female CFOs’ lower 
overconfidence through the reduction in acquisitions. I also examine the difference in divestiture 
behaviors between male and female CFOs. However, most of the results are insignificant, which 
may be partly due to the tendency of female CFOs tend to join firms that are less complex in 




















CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
Using hand-collected data for a large cross-section of newly appointed CFOs over a 
period of 23 years, I investigate which of five theories – overconfidence, risk-aversion, self-
selection, androgyny, or gender bias – may explain the rationale behind investors’ response 
towards a female CFO appointment and CFO gender’s influence on post-hiring firm 
performance.  
First, I find that the stock price response to the hiring announcement is consistent with the 
overconfidence hypothesis as investors react more positively to a female CFO appointment at 
firms operating in low growth industries. This is a key point, indicating that investors do not 
show gender bias towards female executives while appreciating their appropriate level of 
overconfidence in certain environments.  
Second, this study is the first to examine and document that female (male) CFOs help 
improve the post-hiring performance of firms operating in low (high) growth industries, which 
also supports the overconfidence theory. Finally, I document that female CFOs tend to relatively 
lower excess cash holdings in cash-rich firms compared to their male counterparts, which can be 
attributed to the precautionary motive and is also consistent with the overconfidence hypothesis. 
Unlike much of the prior research, my multivariate regressions control for important factors such 
as CFO qualifications and prior experience. I also control for the impact of CEO and for gender 
diversity in the board and in the TMT.  
Interestingly, I also find that female CFOs perform worse when uncertainty increases, 
i.e., during the financial crisis, which may be due to the negative impact of women being less 





My results are robust to employing different methods—the propensity score method, 
Heckman’s (1979) two-stage model, MDV approach (which extracts the relevance of gender 
from executive fixed effects), and difference-in-difference regressions. Moreover, I examine the 
buy and hold returns as an additional measure of performance. The results confirm the findings 
from operating performance.  
Overall, evidence supports the view that female executives are less overconfident than 
male executives but is not supportive of the risk-aversion, androgyny, self-selection, and gender 
bias hypotheses. My findings are buttressed by the fact that female CFOs are able to improve 
performance at low growth firms even though the firms they joined had a bigger asset base, 
where it would be more challenging to enhance firm outcomes. Further, the results may 
understate female CFO performance given the evidence in Peni and Vähämaa (2010) that firms 
with female CFOs are associated with income-decreasing discretionary accruals. I acknowledge 
that there may be some elements of truth to all of the hypotheses under certain situations (i.e., 
some female executives may be more risk averse, some may make their decisions similar to male 
CFOs, while some environments may have gender biases); however, the net effect that I observe 
supports the overconfidence story. 
This research makes several important empirical contributions. First, my analysis 
contributes to the literature on investors’ viewpoints of female executives in terms of abilities 
and behavior, complementing Lee and James’s (2007) and Martin et al.’s (2009) studies. Second, 
I contribute to the literature that examines the impact of C-Suite executive characteristics on firm 
outcomes (e.g. Faccio et al., 2016; Khan & Vieito, 2013; Wolfers, 2006). Third, I complement 
prior findings related to female CFOs’ accounting and financial decisions (Francis et al., 2015; 





influence of female CFOs on firm performance. Fourth, I contribute to the agency cost literature 
by showing that female CFOs tend to relatively reduce excess cash reserves and thus mitigate the 
agency costs of free cash flow compared to their male counterparts. Finally, I enrich the 
emerging literature on overconfidence by documenting the effect of CFO overconfidence on firm 
performance, complementing Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey’s (2013) and Huang and 









































Hypotheses Predicted stock 
response to female 
CFO appointment 
Predicted performance 
of firms appointing 
female CFOs 
Predicted excess cash 





-ve for high growth 
firms 
+ve for low growth firms - 
Risk-aversion 
 
-ve for high & low 
growth firms but more 
so for high growth firms 
 
    -ve for high & low 
growth firms but more so 




No difference No difference No difference 
Androgyny 
 
+ + N/A 
Gender bias 
 





APPENDIX B: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Variable Definition 
 CFO characteristics variables 
ACC-BKG Equals one if the CFO had previous accounting experience, a 
CPA, or a degree specialized in accounting, and zero otherwise. 
CFO Age The age of the new CFO. 
Female CFO Equals one if the new CFO is female, and zero otherwise. 
FIN-BKG Equals one if the CFO had previous finance experience, a CFA, 
or a finance degree, and zero otherwise. 
Insider Equals one if the new CFO is an insider, and zero otherwise. 
MBA Equals one if the new CFO have an MBA, and zero otherwise. 
MGT-EXP Equals one if the new CFO has management experience, zero 
otherwise. 
Was-CFO Equals one if the new CFO held a CFO position previously, zero 
otherwise. 
 Firm characteristics variables 
Acq The ratio of expenditures on acquisitions to the book value of net 
assets (#129 / (#6 - #1)). 
Assets1 The natural log of total assets (item #6). 
Assets2 The natural log of net assets (item #6 - #1). 
Capex1 [Capital expenditure (item #30) divided by total assets (item #6)] 
* 100. 
Capex2 [Capital expenditure (item #30) divided by net assets (item #6 - 
#1)] * 100. 
Cash The natural log of cash / net assets 
Cashflow The ratio of earnings after interest, dividends, and taxes but 
before depreciation to the book value of net assets ((#13 - #15 - 
#16 - #21) / (#6 - #1)). 
COGS [Cost of goods sold (item #41) divided by net sales (item #12)] * 
100 
DIO Days inventory outstanding. Average inventory (item #3) divided 
by daily COGS (item #131)/365), where Average inventory = 
(beginning inventory + ending inventory)/2 
Div_dummy Equals one if the firm paid a common dividend, and zero 
otherwise. 
Div [Dividends of common and preferred stocks (item #21 + #19) 
divided by total assets (item #6)] * 100 
DPO Days payable outstanding. Average AP (item #70) divided by 
daily COGS (item #131)/365), where Average AP = (beginning 
AP + ending AP)/2 
DSO Days sales outstanding. Average AR (item #2) divided by daily 










 Firm characteristics variables 
ExCash The residual from Equation 3 
Leverage1 [Total long-term debt (item #9 + #44) divided by total assets 
(item #6)] * 100 
Leverage2 [Total long-term debt (item #9 + #44) divided by net assets 
(item #6 - #1)] * 100 
Liquidity [Cash (item #1) divided by total assets (item #6)] * 100 
MTB1 Total Assets (item #6) less common equity (item #6) less 
deferred taxes balance sheet (item #74) plus market value of 
equity (item #199 * #25) divided by total assets (item #6). 
MTB2 Net Assets (item #6 - #1) less common equity (item #6) less 
deferred taxes balance sheet (item #74) plus market value of 
equity (item #199 * #25) divided by net assets (item #6 - #1). 
No_SIC The number of primary SIC codes assigned to the firm. 
NWC The ratio of net working capital minus cash plus marketable 
securities to the book value of net assets ((#179 - #1) / (#6 - 
#1)). 
Perf [Operating activities net cash flow (item #308 - #124) divided 
by lagged total assets (item #6)] * 100 
R&D [Research and development expense (item #46) divided by net 
sales (item #12)] * 100. 
ROA [Operating Income after depreciation (item #178) divided by 
total assets (item #6)] * 100 
SG&A [Selling, general and administrative expense (item #132) 
divided by net sales (item #12)] * 100. 
Stborrow [Short-term borrowings (item #206) divided by net sales (item 
#12)] * 100 
Turnover Net sales (item #12) divided by net total assets (item #6 – 
item#2) 
Vol The sum of the squared residuals from the Fama-French three-
factor model 
 Dependent variables 
CARs Three-day cumulative abnormal returns (-1, +1) around the 
announcement of CFO appointments 
ΔCOGS Calculated as COGSt+2 – COGSt-1 
ΔDIO Calculated as DIOt+2 – DIOt-1 
ΔDSO Calculated as DSOt+2 – DSOt-1 
ΔPerf Calculated as Perft+2 – Perft-1 
ΔSG&A Calculated as SG&At+2 – SG&At-1 























 Other variables 
Board-GD Equals one if there is at least one female director in the board 
(excluding the CFO), zero otherwise. 
Boardsize The number of directors in the board 
CEO Tenure The number of years the CEO has been in the position. 
Post Equals one if the year is after the appointment, and zero 
otherwise 
Prior CFO fired Equals one if the old CFO was fired, and zero otherwise. 
Prior CFO retired Equals one if the old CFO retired, and zero otherwise. 
Prior CFO took another 
job 
Equals one if the old CFO got another job, and zero otherwise. 
Prior CFO promoted Equals one if the old CFO was promoted, and zero otherwise. 
TMT-GD Equals one if there is at least one female member in the TMT 
(excluding the CFO), zero otherwise. 
TMT-GD-Yr-1 Equals one if there is at least one female member in the TMT in 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
This table summarizes descriptive statistics for CFOs and firm characteristics in my sample. All firm variables are measured as of 
the fiscal year-end prior to the CFO appointments and are not industry adjusted. See Appendix B for variable definitions. 
 
a Significant at the 0.01 level.  
b Significant at the 0.05 level. 






 Male CFOs (N = 1,219) Female CFOs (N = 130) 
Test of difference 
(M-F) 
 Mean/Frequency Median Mean/Frequency Median t-statistics 
1. MBA 51.52% N/A 49.23% N/A 0.50 
2. Was-CFO 52.75% N/A 49.23% N/A 0.76 
3. MGT-EXP 35.03% N/A 33.85% N/A 0.27 
4. ACC-BKG 65.55% N/A 71.54% N/A -1.37 
5. FIN-BKG 50.04% N/A 56.15% N/A -1.33 
6. Insider 33.85% N/A 31.54% N/A 1.30 
7. CFO Age 46.24 46.00 44.95 45.00 2.72a 
8. Assets1 7.31 7.21 7.37 7.46 -0.40 
9. Leverage1 21.10 19.17 16.80 14.90 2.74a 
10. MTB1 2.09 1.57 2.11 1.71 -0.12 
11. Perf 11.26 10.22 12.80 11.97 -1.46 
12. R&D 6.79 0.43  5.17 0.35 0.96 
13. Liquidity 15.25 7.55 20.39 14.17  -2.88a 
14. Div 1.36 0.24 1.10 0.09 1.28 
15. Vol 0.17 0.10 0.18 0.09 -0.10 
16. Capex1 5.94 4.42 5.11 3.73 2.01b 
17. No_SIC 2.00 1.00 1.78 1.00 2.02b 
18. Acq 0.034 0.000 0.042 0.003 -0.008 
19. NWC 0.064 0.058 0.078 0.094 -0.014 
20. Cf 0.095 0.089 0.122 0.103 -0.027 
21. CAR (%) 0.38 0.08 -0.43 -0.02 1.94c 
22. ΔPerf 0.14 0.00 1.81 0.90 -1.67 c  





Table 2. Announcement Returns for CFO Appointments 
This table presents regression results from Equation 1. The dependent variable is the three-day cumulative abnormal 
announcement returns (CARs) around announcements of CFO appointments. All firm variables are measured as of the fiscal year-



























a Significant at the 0.01 level. 
b Significant at the 0.05 level. 
c Significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
  
 Full Sample 
 All Firms High MTB Low MTB 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female CFO -0.007c -0.007 -0.015a -0.014a 0.005 0.005 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01) (0.53) (0.52) 
CFO Controls       
MBA 0.005c 0.005c 0.011a 0.010a -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.61) (0.60) 
Was-CFO  0.002  0.003  -0.001 
  (0.62)  (0.51)  (0.77) 
MGT-EXP  -0.002  -0.003  -0.003 
  (0.65)  (0.68)  (0.56) 
ACC-BKG  -0.002  -0.002  0.000 
  (0.64)  (0.67)  (0.96) 
FIN-BKG  -0.002  -0.001  -0.007 
  (0.47)  (0.88)  (0.13) 
CFO Age  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.79)  (0.60)  (0.92) 
Firm Controls       
Assets1 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.49) (0.54) (0.88) (0.94) (0.29) (0.32) 
Perf 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.35) (0.36) (0.69) (0.67) (0.16) (0.16) 
Prior CFO fired 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 
 (0.65) (0.65) (0.54) (0.57) (0.85) (0.82) 
Prior CFO retired -0.010a -0.010a -0.008c -0.008 -0.011b -0.012b 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.12) (0.05) (0.03) 
Prior CFO took another job -0.001 0.000 0.012 0.012 -0.012c -0.013c 
 (0.91) (0.95) (0.13) (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) 
Prior CFO promoted -0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.008c -0.009c 
 (0.56) (0.59) (0.69) (0.64) (0.07) (0.07) 
Intercept 0.006 0.007 -0.009 -0.015 0.016 0.025 
 (0.48) (0.70) (0.49) (0.52) (0.18) (0.22) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.029 0.030 0.052 0.054 0.072 0.077 






















a Significant at the 0.01 level. 
b Significant at the 0.05 level. 
c Significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
  
 Propensity Score Sample 
 All Firms High MTB Low MTB 
Independent variables (7) (8) (9) 
Female CFO -0.003 -0.015b 0.000 
 (0.59) (0.05) (0.97) 
CFO Controls    
MBA 0.014b 0.023b 0.011 





 (0.14) (0.09) (0.01) 
MGT-EXP -0.005 -0.002 0.006 
 (0.51) (0.85) (0.55) 
ACC-BKG 0.007 -0.010 0.022a 
 (0.45) (0.24) (0.01) 
FIN-BKG -0.009 0.006 -0.011 
 (0.13) (0.44) (0.28) 
CFO Age 0.001 0.000 0.001b 
 (0.18) (0.81) (0.04) 
Firm Controls    
Assets1 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 
 (0.36) (0.49) (0.36) 
Perf 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.28) (0.77) (0.53) 
Prior CFO fired -0.036 -0.011 -0.042c 
 (0.12) (0.35) (0.08) 
Prior CFO retired 0.003 -0.004 -0.016c 
 (0.66) (0.69) (0.10) 
Prior CFO took another job 0.004 0.003 0.002 
 (0.75) (0.86) (0.83) 
Prior CFO promoted -0.011 0.004 -0.036a 
 (0.19) (0.74) (0.00) 
Intercept -0.029 -0.002 -0.045 
 (0.49) (0.97) (0.33) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.153 0.255 0.404 





Table 3. Multivariate Analysis of the Influence of CFO Gender on Firm Performance 
This table reports the OLS results (Equation 2) explaining the impact of the new CFO on firm performance. The dependent 
variable is ΔPerf. All firm variables are measured as of the fiscal year-end prior to the CFO appointment and are industry 
adjusted. See Appendix B for variable definitions. Numbers in parentheses are P-values. 
a Significant at the 0.01 level. 
b Significant at the 0.05 level. 
c Significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
 All Firms High MTB 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female CFO 1.712b 1.976b 1.921b 1.382 1.934 1.725 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.27) (0.14) (0.18) 
CFO Controls       
Insider 0.665 0.593 0.557 1.595c 1.373 1.301 
 (0.33) (0.40) (0.42) (0.08) (0.14) (0.16) 
MBA 0.836 0.987 0.924 1.134 1.277 1.182 
 (0.19) (0.13) (0.15) (0.20) (0.16) (0.19) 
Was-CFO -0.390 -0.307 -0.414 -0.552 -0.457 -0.542 
 (0.56) (0.66) (0.56) (0.55) (0.63) (0.57) 
MGT-EXP 2.371a 2.335b 2.314b 3.728a 3.823a 3.624a 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ACC-BKG -0.523 -0.393 -0.407 -0.535 -0.446 -0.534 
 (0.43) (0.56) (0.55) (0.54) (0.62) (0.54) 
FIN-BKG -0.631 -0.669 -0.765 -0.336 -0.420 -0.503 
 (0.37) (0.36) (0.29) (0.73) (0.67) (0.62) 
CFO Age 0.070 0.077 0.080 0.054 0.065 0.058 
 (0.26) (0.21) (0.20) (0.52) (0.45) (0.50) 
Firm Controls       
Assets1 -0.598a -0.648a -0.608a -1.004a -1.112a -1.064a 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Leverage1 0.018 0.014 0.012 0.008 0.005 0.004 
 (0.31) (0.46) (0.51) (0.73) (0.82) (0.88) 
Liquidity 0.013 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.018 0.018 
 (0.67) (0.57) (0.61) (0.68) (0.62) (0.60) 
R&D -0.063a -0.063a -0.063a -0.064a -0.065a -0.064a 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
MTB1 -1.031a -1.010a -1.004a -1.345a -1.335a -1.307a 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Div -0.041 -0.035 -0.044 -0.010 0.027 -0.049 
 (0.21) (0.30) (0.19) (0.96) (0.91) (0.83) 
No_SIC -0.297 -0.369c -0.365c -0.245 -0.320 -0.403 
 (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) (0.37) (0.29) (0.19) 
Capex1 -0.311a -0.323a -0.326a -0.346a -0.360a -0.367a 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Vol 2.908 3.036 3.134 3.467 3.691 3.864 
 (0.22) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.15) (0.12) 
TMT-GD  -1.686a   -2.831a  
  (0.01)   (0.00)  
Board-GD  0.627   1.103  
  (0.41)   (0.28)  
CEO Tenure   -0.151a   -0.159a 
   (0.00)   (0.00) 
Board Size    -0.013   0.121 
   (0.92)   (0.53) 
Intercept -4.812 -4.832 -4.040 -5.183 -4.616 -4.082 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.23) (0.23) (0.28) (0.36) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.142 0.150 0.154 0.183 0.197 0.195 



























a Significant at the 0.01 level. 
b Significant at the 0.05 level. 
c Significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
 Low MTB 
Independent variables (7) (8) (9) 
Female CFO 2.116c 1.943c 2.056c 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.08) 
CFO Controls    
Insider -1.314 -1.143 -1.188 
 (0.15) (0.23) (0.21) 
MBA 0.605 0.666 0.628 
 (0.41) (0.39) (0.41) 
Was-CFO -0.911 -1.020 -1.092 
 (0.27) (0.24) (0.21) 
MGT-EXP -0.618 -0.719 -0.677 
 (0.55) (0.50) (0.52) 
ACC-BKG 0.018 0.247 0.300 
 (0.98) (0.77) (0.73) 
FIN-BKG -0.988 -1.092 -1.156 
 (0.23) (0.20) (0.18) 
CFO Age 0.088 0.087 0.101 
 (0.21) (0.23) (0.17) 
Firm Controls    
Assets1 -0.160 -0.241 -0.219 
 (0.59) (0.44) (0.50) 
Leverage1 0.035 0.030 0.026 
 (0.20) (0.31) (0.39) 
Liquidity -0.055 -0.068 -0.073 
 (0.35) (0.27) (0.24) 
R&D 0.116 0.128c 0.125c 
 (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) 
MTB1 -0.273 -0.224 -0.222 
 (0.56) (0.63) (0.64) 
Div -0.067a -0.064b -0.064b 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
No_SIC -0.162 -0.178 -0.174 
 (0.51) (0.48) (0.49) 
Capex1 -0.262a -0.268a -0.267a 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Vol -3.234 -5.065 -4.609 
 (0.37) (0.20) (0.24) 
TMT-GD  -0.285  
  (0.73)  
Board-GD  0.221  
  (0.84)  
CEO Tenure   -0.103 
   (0.11) 
Board Size    -0.029 
   (0.88) 
Intercept -2.121 -3.514 -3.455 
 (0.60) (0.40) (0.43) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.122 0.122 0.128 





Table 4. Multivariate Analysis of the Influence of CFO Gender on Excess Cash Holdings 
This table reports the OLS results (Equation 4) explaining the impact of the new CFO on excess cash holdings. The dependent 
variable is ΔExCash. All firm variables are measured as of the fiscal year-end prior to the CFO appointment. See Appendix B for 
variable definitions. Numbers in parentheses are P-values. 
 
a Significant at the 0.01 level. 
b Significant at the 0.05 level. 




 Cash-rich firms Cash-poor firms Normal firms 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
Female CFO -0.387b 0.063 0.069 
 (0.04) (0.92) (0.57) 
CFO Controls    
Insider 0.160 -0.184 0.058 
 (0.22) (0.52) (0.59) 
MBA 0.046 0.848a -0.050 
 (0.73) (0.00) (0.62) 
Was-CFO 0.095 -0.236 0.049 
 (0.53) (0.40) (0.65) 
MGT-EXP 0.131 -0.565c -0.073 
 (0.47) (0.09) (0.59) 
ACC-BKG -0.163 0.049 0.047 
 (0.25) (0.87) (0.66) 
FIN-BKG -0.042 -0.467c 0.007 
 (0.78) (0.08) (0.95) 
CFO Age 0.007 0.022 -0.009 
 (0.60) (0.34) (0.32) 
Firm Controls    
NWC 0.221 -1.679 -0.352 
 (0.34) (0.26) (0.39) 
MTB2 0.013 -0.082 0.000 
 (0.24) (0.54) (0.98) 
Cf -0.294 1.431 -0.509 
 (0.53) (0.36) (0.25) 
Assets2 0.173a -0.121 0.033 
 (0.00) (0.29) (0.36) 
Capex2 -0.477 -1.689 -0.980 
 (0.69) (0.51) (0.26) 
Acq -0.590 -1.139 -1.278c 
 (0.23) (0.30) (0.10) 
Leverage2 -0.243b -2.741a 0.094 
 (0.05) (0.00) (0.74) 
Div_dummy -0.308c -0.357 0.009 
 (0.10) (0.37) (0.94) 
Intercept -2.790a 2.113 0.467 
 (<.0001) (0.26) (0.51) 
Year and industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.506 0.752 0.262 





Table 5. Robustness Check: Logistic Regression of Hiring a Female CFO 
This table presents regression analysis of the likelihood of hiring a female CFO. The dependent variable is a binary variable that 
equals one if a firm hires a female CFO and zero otherwise (Female CFO). All independent firm variables are measured as of the 



















a Significant at the 
0.01 level. 
b Significant at the 0.05 level. 




Independent variables All firms High MTB Low MTB 
 (1) (2) (3) 
TMT-GD-Yr-1 0.919a 0.694a 1.769a 
 (<.0001) (0.01) (<.0001) 
CEO Tenure 0.020 0.021 0.025 
 (0.12) (0.21) (0.31) 
Perf 0.016 0.014 0.033 
 (0.11) (0.21) (0.19) 
Assets1 0.142b 0.145 0.437a 
 (0.05) (0.11) (0.01) 
Leverage1 -0.014b -0.014a -0.017 
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.27) 
Liquidity 0.021
a 0.018b 0.028 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.15) 
R&D -0.001 -0.001 0.018 
 (0.79) (0.75) (0.69) 
MTB1 -0.100 -0.121 -0.149 
 (0.18) (0.19) (0.37) 
Div -0.055 -0.073 0.009 
 (0.30) (0.27) (0.84) 
No_SIC -0.179
b -0.296b -0.186 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.18) 
Capex1 -0.052
c -0.051 -0.057 
 (0.06) (0.14) (0.24) 
Vol -0.012 0.142 -0.835 
 (0.98) (0.78) (0.69) 
Intercept -3.152a -2.175c -15.235 
 (0.00) (0.06) (0.97) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.125 0.129 0.290 





Table 6A. Robustness Check on Firm Performance: Propensity Method and Heckman’s Two-
Stage Models 
This table reports results of the propensity method and the Heckman two-stage regressions explaining the impact of the new CFO 
on firm performance. The dependent variable is ΔPerf. All firm variables are measured as of the fiscal year-end prior to the CFO 
appointment and are industry adjusted. See Appendix B for variable definitions. Numbers in parentheses are P-values. 
a Significant at the 0.01 level. 
b Significant at the 0.05 level. 




 Propensity Score Sample Full Sample 
 All Firms High MTB Low MTB Heckman Two-Stage Model 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) Stage 1 Stage 2 
Female CFO 1.726c 1.066 2.737b  1.537c 
 (0.09) (0.52) (0.04)  (0.08) 
CFO Controls      
Insider -2.157c 1.317 -2.226  0.425 
 (0.08) (0.53) (0.24)  (0.49) 
MBA 3.008a 0.233 -0.515  0.708 
 (0.01) (0.89) (0.67)  (0.23) 
Was-CFO 0.061 -1.637 -2.548c  -0.099 
 (0.96) (0.29) (0.09)  (0.87) 
MGT-EXP 0.626 2.597 -4.868a  1.163 
 (0.69) (0.25) (0.01)  (0.15) 
ACC-BKG 0.650 1.155 -0.006  -0.226 
 (0.59) (0.54) (1.00)  (0.72) 
FIN-BKG -2.093 -3.454c -0.016  -0.792 
 (0.11) (0.06) (0.99)  (0.21) 
CFO Age -0.084 -0.177 0.120  0.006 
 (0.46) (0.26) (0.43)  (0.92) 
Inverse Mills Ratio     -18.148 
     (0.55) 
Firm Controls      
Assets1 -0.983a  -0.427 0.310 0.084b -1.708 
 (0.01) (0.46) (0.69) (0.02) (0.43) 
Leverage1 0.070b 0.036 0.061 -0.007b 0.138 
 (0.02) (0.49) (0.36) (0.04) (0.45) 
Liquidity 0.069 0.080 0.054 0.012a -0.151 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.49) (0.00) (0.61) 
R&D -0.039c -0.010 0.937c -0.002 -0.034 
 (0.07) (0.83) (0.07) (0.42) (0.52) 
MTB1 -0.938c -0.768 -0.708 -0.018 -0.354 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.46) (0.58) (0.49) 
Div 0.273 -0.323 0.308 -0.030 0.507 
 (0.49) (0.40) (0.62) (0.26) (0.57) 
No_SIC 0.965b -0.694 -0.386 -0.100b 1.285 
 (0.03) (0.39) (0.57) (0.02) (0.62) 
Capex1 -0.147 -0.161 -0.437 -0.020 0.071 
 (0.20) (0.39) (0.13) (0.11) (0.89) 
Vol -0.044 2.026 -7.678 -0.037 3.630 
 (0.99) (0.57) (0.40) (0.88) (0.17) 
Intercept 3.258 11.723 -4.429 -1.167a 29.174 
 (0.65) (0.19) (0.51) (<.0001) (0.56) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.288 0.253 0.452 0.072 0.119 




































a Significant at the 0.01 level. 
b Significant at the 0.05 level. 
c Significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
 








Independent variables (4) (5) (6) 
Female CFO 2.111c 1.319 4.024b 
 (0.06) (0.36) (0.02) 
CFO Controls    
Insider 0.237 0.977 -1.417 
 (0.79) (0.42) (0.23) 
MBA -0.547 -0.206 -1.097 
 (0.50) (0.85) (0.29) 
Was-CFO -1.104 -1.093 -2.261b 
 (0.21) (0.34) (0.05) 
MGT-EXP 3.122a 3.892a 0.681 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.68) 
ACC-BKG -0.553 -0.222 -1.172 
 (0.52) (0.84) (0.33) 
FIN-BKG -1.010 -0.915 -1.263 
 (0.26) (0.45) (0.22) 
CFO Age 0.068 0.038 0.220b 
 (0.36) (0.69) (0.02) 
Inverse Mills Ratio    
    
Firm Controls    
Assets1 -0.794a -1.016a -0.578 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) 
Leverage1 0.021 0.010 0.052 
 (0.39) (0.73) (0.15) 
Liquidity -0.062c -0.055 -0.153b 
 (0.09) (0.18) (0.03) 
R&D -0.010 -0.012 0.202 
 (0.75) (0.72) (0.61) 
MTB1 -0.848b -1.142b 0.455 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.52) 
Div -0.075b -0.320 -0.095a 
 (0.02) (0.15) (0.00) 
No_SIC -0.191 -0.097 -0.295 
 (0.42) (0.75) (0.42) 
Capex1 -0.411a -0.426a -0.372a 
 (<.0001) (0.00) (0.00) 
Vol 4.430 4.471 2.108 
 (0.13) (0.17) (0.47) 
Intercept -3.139 -1.375 -7.449 
 (0.43) (0.78) (0.16) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.122 0.148 0.184 





Table 6B. Robustness Check on Excess Cash Holdings: Heckman’s Two-Stage Models 
This table reports results of the propensity method and the Heckman two-stage regressions explaining the impact of the new CFO 
on excess cash holdings. The dependent variable is ΔExCash. All firm variables are measured as of the fiscal year-end prior to the 
CFO appointment. See Appendix B for variable definitions. Numbers in parentheses are P-values. 
 
a Significant at the 0.01 level. 
b Significant at the 0.05 level. 




 Cash-rich firms Cash-poor firms Normal firms 
 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 
Independent variables       
Female CFO  -0.391b  0.068  0.107 
  (0.04)  (0.91)  (0.39) 
CFO Controls       
Insider  0.160  -0.251  0.046 
  (0.22)  (0.41)  (0.67) 
MBA  0.046  0.831a  -0.065 
  (0.73)  (0.01)  (0.51) 
Was-CFO  0.094  -0.257  0.040 
  (0.54)  (0.35)  (0.71) 
MGT-EXP  0.131  -0.544c  -0.057 
  (0.47)  (0.10)  (0.67) 
ACC-BKG  -0.161  0.041  0.059 
  (0.26)  (0.89)  (0.58) 
FIN-BKG  -0.041  -0.444  0.008 
  (0.79)  (0.11)  (0.95) 
CFO Age  0.007  0.024  -0.008 
  (0.60)  (0.29)  (0.35) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  0.171  -1.626  -8.677b 
  (0.91)  (0.43)  (0.04) 
Firm Controls       
NWC 0.931 0.363 2.718 -5.653 -0.363 2.344c 
 (0.17) (0.78) (0.17) (0.27) (0.46) (0.08) 
MTB2 -0.042 0.007 0.057 -0.177 -0.059 0.455b 
 (0.16) (0.89) (0.82) (0.35) (0.32) (0.04) 
Cf 1.88 -0.010 1.619 -0.703 0.769 -6.275b 
 (0.06) (1.00) (0.64) (0.82) (0.40) (0.02) 
Assets2 0.090 0.186 -0.168 0.130 0.029 -0.174c 
 (0.27) (0.13) (0.37) (0.71) (0.59) (0.09) 
Capex2 -0.167 -0.487 4.066 -7.397 -0.494 2.795 
 (0.94) (0.68) (0.39) (0.35) (0.70) (0.18) 
Acq 0.689 -0.477 -13.588 19.995 1.971b -15.455b 
 (0.60) (0.66) (0.20) (0.46) (0.04) (0.03) 
Leverage2 -0.458 -0.311 1.457 -4.947 -0.586 4.404b 
 (0.42) (0.61) (0.288) (0.11) (0.19) (0.03) 
Div_dummy -0.439 -0.370 0.709 -1.368 0.011 -0.064 
 (0.15) (0.52) (0.23) (0.31) (0.95) (0.63) 
Intercept -5.722 -3.800 -5.002 10.467 -5.672 50.906b 
 (0.99) (0.66) (0.99) (0.33) (0.99) (0.04) 
Year and industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.089 0.506 0.133 0.753 0.050 0.268 





Table 7. Robustness Check on Firm Performance: Difference-in-Differences Method 
This table reports results of the difference-in-differences regressions (Equation 6) explaining the impact of new female CFOs on 
firm performance. The dependent variable is Perf. See Appendix B for variable definitions. Numbers in parentheses are P-values. 
 
 
a Significant at the 0.01 level. 
b Significant at the 0.05 level. 
c Significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
  
 Dif-in-dif Sample 
Independent variables All Firms High MTB Low MTB 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Post * Female CFO 1.819b 1.653 1.673c 
 (0.04) (0.17) (0.09) 
Female CFO -0.088 -0.062 -0.220 
 (0.90) (0.95) (0.78) 
Post -0.018 -0.086 0.066 
 (0.95) (0.84) (0.85) 
Assets1 1.185a 1.243a 0.565a 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Leverage1 -0.034a -0.026b -0.053a 
 (0.00) (0.03) (<.0001) 
Liquidity 0.003 0.010 -0.036 
 (0.89) (0.66) (0.22) 
R&D -0.074a -0.070a -0.121a 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
MTB1 3.204a 2.703a 0.733 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.22) 
Div 0.108a 0.072b -0.174 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.52) 
Capex1 0.565a 0.596a 0.418a 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Intercept -6.326a -0.608 -8.499a 
 (<.0001) (0.68) (<.0001) 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.307 0.286 0.137 





Table 8. Robustness Check on Firm Performance: Mover Dummy Variable Method 
This table reports results of the MDV approach on the CFO mover sample. Panel A reports the regression results on the 
determinant of firm performance with and without the CFO fixed effects (Equations 7 and 8). Panel B reports the results from 
regressing CFO fixed effects in firm performance (from Panel A) on observable time-invariant executive characteristics 
(Equation 9). All firm variables are measured as of the fiscal year-end prior to the CFO appointment and are industry adjusted. 
See Appendix B for variable definitions. Numbers in parentheses are P-values. 
 
a Significant at the 0.01 level. 
b Significant at the 0.05 level. 
c Significant at the 0.10 level. 
Panel A 
Dependent variable:  ΔPerf 
 Pool OLS (No CFO fixed effects) CFO fixed effects 
Firm Controls   
Assets1 -0.709 -0.098 
 (0.17) (0.88) 
Leverage1 0.026 0.041 
 (0.59) (0.45) 
Liquidity -0.024 -0.074 
 (0.84) (0.41) 
R&D 0.123 0.028 
 (0.16) (0.69) 
Dividends -0.683c 0.090 
 (0.09) (0.81) 
Intercept 0.198 -9.059a 
 (0.94) (0.01) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.042 0.102 
N 308 308 
Panel B 
Dependent variable:  CFO fixed effects in firm performance 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Female CFO 3.804b 4.360a 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
MBA 1.598 2.342c 
 (0.27) (0.08) 
Was-CFO  -2.016 
  (0.28) 
MGT-EXP  6.285a 
  (0.00) 
ACC-BKG  4.673a 
  (0.00) 
FIN-BKG  -2.601 
  (0.12) 
Year of Birth -0.281b -0.293a 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
Year of Appointment 0.233c 0.013 
 (0.10) (0.94) 
Intercept 89.182 551.579 
 (0.66) (0.14) 





Table 9. Distinguish the Impacts of Overconfidence and Ethical Sensitivities 
This table compares cash-rich firms’ excess cash holdings (ExCash) between those with female CFOs and those with 
male CFOs in different categories of economic conditions  
 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
Economic conditions 
Male CFO Female CFO 
Diff. 
Mean N Mean N 
All time 1.4714 5,692 1.3563 477 0.115a 
No crisis 1.4801 4,701 1.3475 397 0.1326a 
Crisis 1.4298 991 1.4001 80 0.0297 
 
CFO gender 
No crisis Crisis 
Diff. 
Mean N Mean N 
Male CFO 1.4801 4701 1.4298 991 0.0503a 
Female CFO 1.3475 397 1.4001 80 -0.0526 
 
 
Panel B: Propensity score subsample 
Economic conditions 
Male CFO Female CFO 
Diff. 
Mean N Mean N 
All time 1.4946 477 1.3563 477 0.1382a 
No crisis 1.5056 393 1.3475 397 0.1581a 
Crisis 1.4428 84 1.4001 80 0.0427 
 
CFO gender 
No crisis Crisis 
Diff. 
Mean N Mean N 
Male CFO 1.5056 393 1.4428 84 0.0628 





Table 10. Firm Performance Based on Buy-and-Hold Returns 
This table compares the change in buy-and-hold returns (ΔBHR) and the change in industry-adjusted buy-and-hold returns 
(ΔBHAR) for firms hiring female CFOs and those hiring male CFOs. ΔBHR is measured as the difference between 12-month buy-
and-hold returns following the appointment (starting the month post appointment) and 12-month buy-and-hold returns prior to the 
appointment (ending in the month prior to the appointment). To calculate BHAR, I subtract the return of the benchmark, the 49 
Fama and French (1997) industry groupings returns, from the raw buy-and-hold returns. I report the means and perform a t-test to 
examine the significance of the difference. 
 All Firms High MTB Low MTB 















BHR (Full sample)           
Post-app. 12-month BHR 0.188 0.175  0.013 0.227 0.165 0.062 0.127 0.187 -0.060 
Pre-app.  12-month BHR 0.133 0.135 -0.002 0.126 0.194 -0.068 0.143 0.055 0.088b 
   Difference (M-F) 0.055 0.040  0.015 0.101 -0.029 0.130 -0.016 0.132 -0.148c 
          
BHR (Propensity Score 
Sample) 
         
Post-app. 12-month BHR 0.084 0.175 -0.091 0.325 0.165 0.160 0.079 0.187 -0.108 
Pre-app.  12-month BHR 0.088 0.135 -0.047 0.130 0.194 -0.064 0.211 0.055 0.156 
   Difference (M-F) -0.004 0.040 -0.044 0.195 -0.029 0.224 -0.132 0.132 -0.264b 
          
BHAR (Full sample)          
Post-app. 12-month BHAR 0.098 0.115 -0.017 0.141 0.142 -0.001 0.031 0.079 -0.049 
Pre-app. 12-month BHAR 0.006 0.031 -0.025 -0.001 0.093 -0.094 0.017 -0.053 0.070c 





Table 11. Impact of CFO Gender on Cost Efficiency and WCM Efficiency 
This table reports results of OLS regressions explaining the difference in decision making between male and female CFOs. The 
dependent variables are ΔSG&A, ΔCOGS, ΔDSO, and ΔDIO. All firm variables are measured as of the fiscal year-end prior to the 
CFO appointment and are industry adjusted. See Appendix B for variable definitions. Numbers in parentheses are P-values. 
a Significant at the 0.01 level. 
b Significant at the 0.05 level. 
c Significant at the 0.10 level. 
  
 ΔSG&A ΔCOGS 
Independent variables All Firms High MTB Low MTB All Firms High MTB Low MTB 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female CFO -4.595a -4.176c -5.232c -2.935c -4.747c 0.869 
 (0.01) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.44) 
CFO Controls      
Insider -4.768 -6.248 0.327 0.279 -0.719 1.855b 
 (0.29) (0.31) (0.60) (0.92) (0.88) (0.02) 
MBA -2.788 -4.612 0.008 -0.552 -1.657 0.889 
 (0.28) (0.24) (0.99) (0.78) (0.60) (0.22) 
Was-CFO 2.256 3.562 0.707 0.880 1.569 -0.358 
 (0.42) (0.40) (0.43) (0.64) (0.57) (0.64) 
MGT-EXP 5.211 6.872 -0.682 1.449 1.545 0.735 
 (0.43) (0.41) (0.46) (0.57) (0.65) (0.51) 
ACC-BKG -0.472 -1.152 0.167 0.352 -0.021 0.772 
 (0.58) (0.38) (0.78) (0.87) (0.99) (0.44) 
FIN-BKG -3.659 -5.201 -0.700 -3.159 -4.826 -0.171 
 (0.16) (0.20) (0.36) (0.16) (0.19) (0.89) 
CFO Age -0.337c -0.446 -0.171c -0.003 0.046 -0.117c 
 (0.10) (0.16) (0.08) (0.99) (0.90) (0.10) 
Firm Controls       
Assets1 -0.251 -0.147 0.384c -0.276 -0.417 0.004 
 (0.46) (0.72) (0.06) (0.64) (0.66) (0.99) 
ROA 0.739 0.897 0.064c 0.488b 0.437c 0.677a 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.10) (0.03) (0.09) (0.01) 
MTB -2.389 -2.741 -0.002 -1.156 -0.968 -2.067b 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.99) (0.32) (0.49) (0.03) 
Intercept 17.213b 24.419c 7.014 4.618 6.277 7.270c 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.19) (0.70) (0.73) (0.10) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.057 0.074 0.159 0.029 0.027 0.273 





Table 11. (Continued) 
 
 
a Significant at the 0.01 level. 
b Significant at the 0.05 level. 
c Significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
  
 ΔDSO ΔDIO 
Independent variables All Firms High MTB Low MTB All Firms High MTB Low MTB 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Female CFO -4.052 0.384 -7.265c -2.443 -2.851 1.300 
 (0.23) (0.94) (0.09) (0.51) (0.61) (0.68) 
CFO Controls       
Insider -6.132c -7.486 -0.349 -2.765 -4.356 -1.133 
 (0.09) (0.15) (0.88) (0.29) (0.25) (0.65) 
MBA -0.922 -1.603 0.207 -0.742 -1.837 -0.153 
 (0.82) (0.78) (0.93) (0.76) (0.61) (0.94) 
Was-CFO -2.526 -3.221 -1.273 2.544 1.758 2.294 
 (0.41) (0.45) (0.56) (0.27) (0.58) (0.29) 
MGT-EXP 3.099 -1.076 5.010b 1.551 -1.643 8.351c 
 (0.40) (0.80) (0.06) (0.63) (0.66) (0.07) 
ACC-BKG -3.719 -6.026 -0.558 -0.643 -2.541 3.404c 
 (0.23) (0.16) (0.79) (0.78) (0.46) (0.08) 
FIN-BKG -5.067a -4.235 -3.129 -0.945 1.477 -5.354a 
 (0.01) (0.14) (0.22) (0.70) (0.67) (0.01) 
CFO Age -0.091 0.252 -0.123 -0.650a -0.748b -0.321c 
 (0.75) (0.60) (0.36) (0.01) (0.02) (0.10) 
Firm Controls       
Assets1 0.380 0.524 0.461 1.534c 1.996c -0.250 
 (0.63) (0.71) (0.67) (0.07) (0.06) (0.76) 
DPO -0.129c -0.154b 0.016 -0.142c -0.151c -0.011 
 (0.09) (0.05) (0.81) (0.09) (0.08) (0.52) 
Turnover 0.455 -0.174 1.552 -0.635 -1.023 0.020 
 (0.65) (0.89) (0.17) (0.39) (0.26) (0.98) 
Stborrow -231.408 -335.400 -61.428c -31.262 -45.554 0.183 
 (0.15) (0.13) (0.06) (0.20) (0.13) (0.99) 
Intercept 13.766 7.227 6.061 33.762a 39.080b 14.722 
 (0.21) (0.69) (0.45) (0.00) (0.02) (0.12) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.180 0.244 0.071 0.168 0.199 0.109 





Table 12. Impact of CFO Gender on Acquisitions and Divestitures 
This table compares the number of acquisitions and divestitures, and total acquisition and divestiture values in year (t+1) and year 
(t+2) for firms hiring male CFOs and firms hiring female CFOs for the whole sample and for high and low growth subgroups. I 
perform a t-test to examine the significance of the difference. 
a Significant at the 0.01 level. 
b Significant at the 0.05 level. 
c Significant at the 0.10 level. 
  


















Acquisitions          
No. of Acquisitions 1.184 0.946 0.238 1.402 1.238 0.165 0.772 0.469 0.303c 
Total deal value / 
market assets 
9.190 5.726 3.464 10.540 6.630 3.910 4.572 1.077 3.495c 
Total deal value / 
market equity 
13.078 8.873 4.205 14.671 10.198 4.473 7.628 2.055 5.573c 
          
Divestitures          
No. of Divestitures 0.703 0.731 -0.028 0.758 0.675 0.083 0.601 0.820 -0.220 
Total deal value / 
market assets 
1.268 0.867 0.401 1.615 0.867 0.748 1.646 2.241 -0.595 
Total deal value / 
market equity 
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